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**THESIS**

**THE ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER EDUCATIONAL  
PIPELINE: A SUPPLY AND DEMAND ANALYSIS**

by

Sarita Malik

December 2008

Thesis Co-Advisors:

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Third Reader:

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**THE ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER EDUCATIONAL PIPELINE: A  
SUPPLY AND DEMAND ANALYSIS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS**

from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study analyzes the requirements of CA officers to operate successfully in the United States' present and future military interventions. First the study assesses the current and future threat situation combined with the most recent United States policy and doctrine to determine the skill set required of current and future CA officers. Second, this study critically evaluates the current Army Civil Affairs (CA) Officer educational pipeline from commissioning through field grade officer to determine the skills CA officers with which the military indoctrinates and trains CA officers. The study compares the required skill set to the existing curriculum, and additional skills not incorporated into the existing CA officer training are described and examined for relevancy. The study concludes with several different educational options that could potentially resolve the skill shortfalls.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>ADT</b>	Active Duty for Training
<b>AOWC</b>	Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course
<b>CAPT</b>	Civil Affairs planning team
<b>CAT</b>	Civil Affairs team
<b>CC</b>	Common Core
<b>CCC</b>	Captains' Career Course
<b>CGSC</b>	Command and General Staff College
<b>CLT</b>	Civil liaison team
<b>CMO</b>	civil-military operations
<b>CMOC</b>	civil-military operations center
<b>COIN</b>	counterinsurgency
<b>CRS</b>	Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
<b>CT</b>	counterterrorism
<b>DE</b>	distance education
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DODD</b>	Department of Defense Directive
<b>FID</b>	foreign internal defense
<b>GWOT</b>	Global War on Terrorism
<b>HN</b>	host nation
<b>IA</b>	interagency
<b>IGO</b>	intergovernmental organization
<b>ILE</b>	intermediate level education
<b>IO</b>	information operations
<b>JOC</b>	joint operating concept
<b>MIDLIFE</b>	Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Finance, and Economics
<b>NGO</b>	nongovernmental organization
<b>OJT</b>	on the job training

<b>OSD</b>	Office of the Secretary of Defense
<b>OGA</b>	other government agency
<b>PSYOPs</b>	psychological operations
<b>SOF</b>	special operations forces
<b>SSC</b>	senior staff college
<b>SSTRO</b>	stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction Operations
<b>TASS</b>	The Army School System
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USACAPOC</b>	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
<b>USASWC</b>	John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
<b>USG</b>	United States government
<b>USSOCOM</b>	United States Special Operations Command
<b>UW</b>	unconventional warfare

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Secure and serve the population. The Iraqi people are the decisive ‘terrain.’ Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies. (Petraeus, 2008, p. 2)

The opening lines of multinational force Iraq commander General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency guidance reflect a shift, many years after an insurgency began in Iraq in 2003, to a view of the population as the focus of the United States (U.S.) war effort. The U.S. military’s Civil Affairs (CA) officers are the subject matter experts on the civil terrain of the battlefield who provide this critical expertise to facilitate U.S. goals.

### **A. PURPOSE**

The 2005 National Defense Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review address the threats of failing and failed states and ungoverned areas that face the U.S. military, and emphasize stability operations and other important “new” capacities the U.S. military should have to tackle them. In response, the Department of Defense’s focus on economic development in support of stability operations should increase in pre/post conflict environments. More evidence of this shift is in Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which directs the Army to integrate stability operations into its training in addition to conventional warfare.

This operational shift is slowly permeating throughout the military’s structure, including training and education. Civil Affairs (CA) generalists and functional specialists bear the responsibility of planning and implementing such policy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Despite these tremendous responsibilities, most CA personnel receive little more than their introductory training to prepare them for their economic and political development roles; they must often instead develop knowledge through their civilian sector jobs or “on the job training.” A new CA officer (O3, or Captain) attends the CA qualification course (CAQC), which covers basic CA responsibilities and CA’s role in the “Big Army.” The next course the officer attends as

an O4 or Major is Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Neither of these courses teaches the CA officer how to conduct stability or reconstruction operations. Following ILE, the Army would likely employ a CA officer as an operational or strategic planner.

## **1. Background and Origin**

The history of civil affairs in the United States precedes the Civil War. One of the earliest examples of the military's conducting civil affairs is the Mexican War of 1845. After making quick work of opposing forces, the military set about administering the conquered territories (Sandler, 1994, p. 35). General Winfield Scott utilized his troops to establish security, enforcing standards on both his own troops and the local population. The military government ultimately focused on six key areas: fiscal, public works, public health, public safety, legal, and education (Sandler, 1994, p. 37). Though facing many challenges, the military commanders emphasized fairness and autonomy of the local government they were establishing (Sandler, 1994, pp. 41-43).

Another of the most often-cited historical examples of the U.S. civil affairs is the reconstruction period following the Civil War. During this period, the Army heavily invested in judicial systems, economic development, and caring for freed slaves, among other civil activities (Guttieri, 2008c, p. 12).

The U.S. military played similar roles in subsequent conflicts in which the U.S. was involved. Finally, during World War II, the USG officially integrated specific CA forces into the military as a specialized branch to perform these functions. CA forces administered "areas captured or liberated by U.S. forces before civilian administrators were present to take over" (Simons & Tucker, 2003, p. 83).

As the term "civil" implies, civil affairs forces differ from other aspects of the military by focusing on interaction with the civilian population (Guttieri, 2003, pp. 99-100). CA forces help form the bridges between the U.S. military and the civilian population. "The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organization in the operational environment to achieve a desired effect" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-1). CA Officers routinely participate in operations

encompassing the operational spectrum from stability operations designed to prevent conflict to post-conflict reconstruction efforts designed to facilitate regional stability. These operations may be in support of conventional and unconventional elements, potentially involving close cooperation with international and non-governmental agencies.

The core capabilities of CA forces are civil operations and civil reconnaissance. CA's core tasks include civil information management, populace and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance and support to civil administration. Post-conflict, CA forces help to establish order and to provide services for the local population (Guttieri, 2003, p. 95). This includes civic action and humanitarian assistance such as building schools, laying roads, or digging wells as well as establishing and managing policy, such as governmental and financial infrastructures (Guttieri, 2003, p. 100).

While these actions do not necessarily change the population's living conditions, they facilitate friendship and relationship building. This helps with operations such as those in Iraq and post-conflict reconstruction. Civic action thus "doubles as a force multiplier.... it helps dry up the sea of supporters in which opposing forces swim by providing a more stabilized, improved, and secure local environment" (Simons & Tucker, 2003, p. 83).

## **2. Doctrine**

According to the latest Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, which describes the Army's officer career fields and paths, CA personnel are those who are capable of planning, organizing, and executing CA operations and supporting civil-military operations (CMO)<sup>1</sup> (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 179). CA

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<sup>1</sup> Civil Military Operations are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. 88).

forces, other military forces, or a combination of the two can perform CMO (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-1). The mission of CA forces is

to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning CA operations in Army, Joint, interagency, and multinational operations to support commanders in engaging the civil component of their operational environment...to enhance civil-military operations or other stated U.S. objectives before, during, or after other military operations. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 179)

CA officers are those who should possess the specialized skills to oversee and to execute these functions. The Army divided the CA Officer corps into two categories: CA Generalists, and Functional Specialists. Functional Specialists, found only in the United States Army Reserve (USAR), possess civilian core competencies including “public health and welfare, public safety/rule of law, public administration/governance, public works/infrastructure, business administration/economic stability, and public education and information” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 179). CA Generalists lead teams of enlisted specialists and advise key leaders on staffs in CA policy, strategy, and execution.

Figure 1 illustrates the integrated nature of Civil Military Operations within a combatant or unified commander’s operations. CA officers usually form a CMO staff that plays a key role in assisting commanders in facilitating relationships with external agencies such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the host nation (HN), and serve as subject matter experts (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-21).

The CMO staff plans its operations according to the CA core tasks, as illustrated in Figure 2. Civil military operations centers (CMOCs) and their civil liaison teams (CLTs) work with the Civil Affairs planning teams (CAPTs) to facilitate the coordination effort with the external elements and synchronize them with those of the Civil Affairs Teams (CATs) and the CA functional specialists (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-3).



Figure 1. Civil-Military Operations Relationships (From Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-20)

The CA forces plan and direct their operations towards “a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal” that supports the commander’s military objectives and ultimately his political objectives (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-9). For example, at the strategic level, the goal is on “larger long-term global or regional issues such as economic development and stability” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-5). The operational level focuses on “immediate and near-term issues (for example, dislocated civilian [DC] operations, public safety programs, and so on), synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders, and integration of interagency operations with military operations,” while the tactical level addresses even more urgent needs such as “food distribution, local security programs, basic health service support to the local populace, and support of IGO and NGO humanitarian operations” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-5).




Figure 2. CA Operational Support Structure (From Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-3)

The demand for CA specialists exploded during the conflict in Iraq. As a result of the high number of deployments and operational requirements, the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) reevaluated the organization of Reserve CA units, which was composed mostly of teams of functional specialists (CAT Bs) as opposed to teams composed of CA generalists (CAT As). The result shifted the balance of functional specialists and generalists in the Reserve forces so that the majority of CA forces are now generalists (G. Woodson, personal communication, November 11, 2008). The high demand for CA officers and the Reserve to Active duty force ratio also had the effect of blurring the distinction between functional specialists and generalists, to the point that leaders interacting with CA officers now expect all of them to know and understand the civilian core competencies listed above (J.K. Owens, personal communication, November 4, 2008; G. Woodson, personal communication, November 11, 2008).

Though the War in Iraq brought the missions of the Reserve and Active duty forces closer together, the discussions about CA forces had another unforeseen impact. As the sole CA proponent and manager, SOCOM managed all CA personnel deployments, assignment, and training. Traditionally, primarily Active duty CA forces supported SOF operations, worked with embassies and performed interagency missions. Reserve CA forces supported conventional forces such as brigades and combatant

command headquarters. Because only Reserve CA forces have functional specialists, the CA functional specialists support both types of missions. In 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued several snowflakes<sup>2</sup> questioning the assignment of all CA forces to SOCOM (G3 MOSO-SOD, 2004; K. Guttieri, personal communication, October 9, 2008). Rumsfeld questioned SOCOM's operational control of CA forces because of the mission dichotomy between conventional Army and SOF support.

In 2006, the Secretary of Defense made the final decision to split the CA forces, assigning the Reserve CA forces to United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) and leaving the Active CA forces with SOCOM. SOCOM effectively lost control of the Reserve CA forces except through proponency and doctrine. USARC now has complete responsibility, control, and authority for staffing, mobilizing, and training the Reserve CA forces.

Instead of improving CA's relationship with the conventional Army, the change seemingly diluted CA missions and experience. With the current operational situation, both Active and Reserve CA officers find themselves assigned to support conventional Army and SOF. During peacetime, CA forces may find themselves relegated back to their traditionally divergent missions. This may not have a significant impact on CA generalists, but the functional specialists will lose a significant link to SOCOM's missions and operations, including deployments and exercises, which could impact CA experience and expertise during the next large military conflict or intervention.

Most importantly for this thesis, the reorganization placed the impetus for training onto USARC, which until recently, lacked any personnel with CA experience. The resources, funding, and mission of USARC is different from that of SOCOM. As a very small, specialized branch, CA units and personnel may not receive the funds they need to sustain critical training and skills. The separation also prohibits CA personnel from attending the same training from SWC as Active duty CA officers, from experienced CA NCOs and officers.

---

<sup>2</sup> A "snowflake" is an action memo that requires a formal reply from the staff member to whom it is directed.

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps also have CA officers, though the Army has the preponderance of the forces. In the Navy, CA is a temporary duty for which an officer receives several weeks of training and then serves as a CA officer for two or more years. While organizational culture is changing, officers who perform this duty may be at a disadvantage because their hierarchy accords less relevance to a CA job compared to one in the officer's primary career field (G. Woodson, personal communication, November 18, 2008).

The Marine Corps has two civil affairs groups (CAGs), both part of the Reserve component. All of the personnel are CA generalists. The CAGs belong to the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) to support and expand the MEF's capabilities or that of another Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003, p. VI-2). During the Iraq conflict, CAGs deployed teams to support brigades throughout the country (COL Jenkins and team, 2007).

Each of these forces develops and executes its own training. The forces share common guidance from Joint Doctrine that provides information on U.S. stability operations and CA, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations, respectively.

## **B. THESIS**

This thesis argues that a mismatch exists between the current skill demand for military CA officers and the skill supply. This thesis supports the argument through an analysis of current United States Government (USG) policy, the future threat, and current operations to determine the current skill set demanded of CA officers and comparing that skill set to that taught through a CA officer's professional military education (PME) and development.

## **C. OUTLINE**

This thesis progresses as follows. Chapter II determines the demand for CA officers by assessing the current United States' threat environment, the resulting national and DoD policies and missions evolving in response to those policies, and current CA

roles worldwide. The current and future CA missions, threat assessments, and changing policy generate capability requirements and shortfalls. Chapter III analyzes the supply of these capabilities and requirements by reviewing the current CA educational pipeline. Chapter IV compares the demand indicated in Chapter II to the supply in Chapter III and identifies any shortfalls. Chapter V concludes with recommendations for change and improvement in the CA educational pipeline and identifies other CA areas of concern for future study.

#### **D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS**

The increased demand placed on CA forces since the inception of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts produced significant changes and discussions both within and about the Civil Affairs community. As a result of these discussions, the CA branch is rapidly evolving. As with any bureaucracy, change is slow, with formal doctrine and education often the last to adapt. This thesis seeks to understand the limitations and restrictions placed on the educators, who are limited to their fixed curricula and does not address the Army's system for integrating changes and updates.

During the course of research for this thesis, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities requested that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conduct an independent assessment of DoD Civil Affairs capabilities (Hicks, 2008). The study examines the following issues:

- What are DoD Civil Affairs forces required to do in accordance with USG and DoD policies from the tactical to strategic levels of war?
- What are the gaps between USG/DoD policies for stability and reconstruction operations, and DoD Civil Affairs policy, doctrine and structure?
- What structure adjustments are required to ensure sufficient and efficient utilization of DoD Civil Affairs capabilities to support both MCO and IW missions?
- What changes should be made to DoD Directive 2000.13 “Civil Affairs” to ensure DoD Civil Affairs capabilities can support a whole-of-government approach for stabilization and reconstruction operations?

- What is the appropriate mix of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) Civil Affairs capabilities to support the range of military operations? (Hicks, 2008).

Many of the questions in the study overlap with the subject of this thesis, and further illustrates the importance the USG currently dedicates to this topic.

## II. THE NEED FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE CURRENT AND FUTURE THREAT ENVIRONMENT

This chapter analyzes the post-9/11 threat environment and the national security policies, directives, and military operating concepts the United States Government (USG) issued to address the new operational environment. The recently released 2008 National Defense Strategy highlights the need for the United States (U.S.) to develop capabilities to engage in non-conventional operations. As the USG first noted in the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and articulated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the likelihood of the U.S.’ engaging in unconventional or irregular warfare<sup>3</sup> (IW) is of higher probability than conventional conflict. As such, the need for irregular warfare capabilities, to include civil affairs, is likely to increase dramatically over the foreseeable future.

In response to its augmented responsibilities and expanded mission sets, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) focus on civil and economic development, sometimes called “state-building,” in support of stability operations (SOs) increased. Current operations in post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq reflect the Army and other services’ activities in these areas.<sup>4</sup>

The 2005 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 reflects the increased need for SO capability, and directs the Army to integrate SOs into its training in addition to conventional warfare. Recent publication updates in many of the military’s tactical and doctrine manuals integrate this change. The new emphasis indicates that SOs are now part of the military’s greater overall strategy of waging IW, which includes counterinsurgency (CI), counterterrorism (CT), stability operations (SOs), and foreign internal defense (FID) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008a, pp. 2-4).

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<sup>3</sup> This paper defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. 6).

<sup>4</sup> DoD defines “Stability Operations (SOs)” as “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions” (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 2).

With these new policy documents and manuals come personnel, tactical, and skill requirements. For the CA community, understanding this new demand signal is important if CA is to provide the desired capabilities articulated in these policy documents. This chapter analyzes the current and future operational environments and identifies the demand for U.S. personnel capabilities to conduct civil-military operations. Subsequent chapters will assess the CA supply and determine whether there is a mismatch between the supply and demand for CA functions.

## **A. A CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT**

### **1. Defining the Future Threat and Irregular Warfare**

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. focused on facing the Soviet Union’s (USSR) conventional force capabilities. In 1991, the USSR’s fall appeared to sound the death knell of communism and the last obstacle to a free world. At this time, even China was liberalizing its economy, “decollectivizing” agriculture and deregulating the sales of many consumer goods (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 7). This apparent triumph of liberal capitalism over communism and socialism meant that world wars would be a historical anachronism – the U.S. military could downsize, and the population could focus internally on its own economic development and interests.

Despite the “conquest” of communism, conflict continued around the world, such as Somalia, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Rwandan genocide. These conflicts were not ideology based, as in the U.S.-USSR democracy-communism sense, but rather appeared to stem from ethnic, economic, or religious causes. The U.S. seemed uninterested unless the conflict affected U.S. economic interests, getting involved in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict both to aid its ally Kuwait and to protect a significant source of its oil. Only with United Nations (UN) or other international pressure did the U.S. intervene in the Somali conflict, and completely denied the genocide in Rwanda. As long as these issues remained local, countries like the U.S. remained aloof.

Political scientist Samuel Huntington described this next phase of conflict a “Clash of Civilizations,” in which cultural differences are the root cause of conflicts.<sup>5</sup> According to his theory, increased globalization and interaction through travel, media, trade, and the internet would result in cultural conflicts, with war a possible outcome (Huntington, 1993, pp. 23-24). Martin van Creveld also saw conflict “motivated...by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties” (van Creveld, 1991, p. 197). The religious roots of the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforce these theories.

Martin van Creveld foreshadowed how these conflicts would be fought in the future: low-intensity conflict<sup>6</sup> (LIC). He compared conflicts such as the Vietnam War to conventional wars and the inability of highly technological, conventional, regular military forces to face that threat (van Creveld, 1991, pp. 18-28). “In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers” (van Creveld, 1991, p. 197).

The most publicized and recognized threats to the U.S. today are sub-national groups espousing “a violent extremist ideology” and other aggressive philosophies, which are not limited by borders, states, the law, or human life. Many such groups arise from the incapability of many states to effectively deter or capture these groups; the resulting insecurity provides a fertile environment for recruitment and violence. Rogue states<sup>7</sup> such as Iran and North Korea exacerbate problems by funneling money, weapons, and supplies to these groups or providing a safe area for these groups to train or perform illicit criminal acts to support their violent activities (Gates, 2008a, p. 2).

LIC is closely related to another concept, termed “Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW).” 4GW is more political than technical and is the only type of warfare in which

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<sup>5</sup> Samuel Huntington described a civilization as a group with a common history, language, religion, customs, institutions, and self-identification of its people (Huntington, 1993, pp. 23-24).

<sup>6</sup> van Creveld describes the principal characteristics of LIC: “First, they tend to unfold in “less developed” parts of the world....Second, very rarely do they involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is a question of regulars on one side fighting guerillas, terrorists, and even civilians on the other....Thus, most LICs do not rely primarily on the high-technology collective weapons that are the pride and joy of any modern armed force.” (van Creveld, 1991, p. 20).

<sup>7</sup> The term “rogue state” traditionally applies to states that threaten world peace by failing to adhere to the rule of law. These states usually have totalitarian regimes, support terrorism, and advocate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Litwak, 2000).

the U.S. failed to achieve a decisive victory, such as in Vietnam. 4GW focuses on sending a message to enemy policymakers to convince them to change their mind on an issue of interest. These messages can be disseminated through media, legal political channels, and more forcefully, through violence and bloodshed (Hammes, 2005, pp. 2-3). Because of its low cost and minute footprint, LIC is the best means for smaller, weaker forces to fight larger forces and equalize opportunities for success.

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan bear this out. Terrorism, guerilla warfare, and insurgency are direct implementations of this type of warfare. Because these types of forces usually lack the technology, equipment, and numbers to fight the enemy directly, they avoid direct confrontation and instead focus on imposing costs on the enemy. These costs include “the loss of soldiers, supplies, infrastructure, peace of mind, and most important, time....Its goal is to destroy not the capacity but the will of the attacker” (Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. 103).

The military accepted the pervasiveness of LIC and updated its doctrine, terming LIC “Irregular Warfare (IW).” The military first coined the term IW to refer to anything not conventional warfare, referring to the U.S.’ using irregular means to battle unconventional enemies (Safire, 2008, p. 22). IW differs significantly from conventional warfare in that it discourages direct actions that may cause secondary harm to the local population; one of the key issues with IW is the inability to separate the fighter from the population. Figure 3 shows the different focus of conventional warfare on the military versus IW’s focus on the population to effect the desired change. Because the enemy looks like any other citizen, unfocused attacks directed at guerillas have the potential to harm innocent bystanders instead of the intended target. The success of guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists<sup>8</sup> comes from their tacit acceptance by the majority of the population. IW is a long-term proposition, and campaign planning for IW requires a timeframe of years and decades, not weeks or months.

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<sup>8</sup> An insurgent is a member of a political party who rebels against established leadership (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 269).

Current operations support these facts. The COIN operations conducted by U.S. forces in Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines (OEF-P) are one illustration. In this operation, U.S. SOF, including CA forces, conducted operations designed to support, enhance, and develop civilian infrastructure and control, while simultaneously working with local security forces and government organizations to improve efficiency and effectiveness. For example, SF units worked with local military forces to improve their ability to find and capture insurgents. CA forces conducted assessments to determine the best way to meet the needs of individual towns and areas, and built schools or dug wells depending on local requirements (Wendt, 2005, pp. 5-7).




Figure 3. Contrasting Conventional & Irregular Warfare (From U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. 8)

Recent operations in Anbar Province in Iraq also support the effectiveness of this approach. In Anbar, the local population collaborated with U.S. forces in building and development projects, and learned how to fight the insurgents. In this instance, insurgents alienated the local population by murdering tribal leaders. The new trust in the U.S. and frustration and anger aimed at the terrorists inspired many locals to join the local police and militia forces. These forces, supported by the Coalition, successfully conducted offensive operations and the population quickly realized that it could reestablish security and control of its own province (U.S. Department of State, 2008).

## 2. Operations in an Unconventional Environment

Despite the potential rosy picture painted by the fall of communism, large states such as Russia and China do remain threats, and therefore the U.S. should maintain some conventional capability. For example, Russia's conflict with Georgia in August 2008 involved modern weapons, armored combat vehicles, and conventional battlefield tactics.

However, the non-state actor threats require an unconventional or irregular approach, to which the U.S. is unaccustomed. As Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert M. Gates stated, "we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide both short-term and long-term all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as we are in today" (Gates, 2008b).

IW may not require the same degree of technology or conventional force; in fact, excessive force could be detrimental to the mission (Mack, 1975, p. 177). For example, the U.S. policy of emplacing large numbers of troops patrolling is questionable, as "a large foreign military presence or occupation force in any country undermines the legitimacy of the host-nation government in the eyes of its citizens and the international community" (G. Wilson, 2006, p. 3).

One tactic to earn the trust of the population is the "soft," multipronged approach, which avoids heavy conventional combat power that is ineffective against light guerilla and insurgent forces and alienates the local population. The U.S. implements this strategy by improving the "capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression" (Gates, 2008a, p. 6). This element of establishing security and trust are among the most important aspects of IW. A government, community, or group that cannot protect its members and citizens quickly loses their trust and loyalty. Only can secure populations safely pursue their livelihoods and even consider issues such as democratic governance.

However, the U.S. definition of security differs from that of the native population. The U.S. considers security "negative peace [or] the absence of armed conflict" (Donini, Minear, Smillie, van Baarda, & Welch, 2005, p. 16). This definition ignores the petty crime, theft, and corruption that takes place in the absence of development and jobs and

fails to address the root of the problem. In Afghanistan, for example, many in the local population equate security with employment and access to adequate services: “Peace is jobs and electricity” (Donini et al., 2005, p. 16). These two different visions result in a disconnect between the U.S.’ intentions and the population’s needs. The USG must implement and coordinate an integrated plan that will achieve a secure environment and meet the needs of the local population.

In addition to security, “essential ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, [and] strategic communications,” all of which fall under the header of state capacity, as illustrated in Table 1, below (Gates, 2008a, p. 17). Table 1 shows the aspects of state capacity that any community needs to be viable and the factors that influence them. In the current threat environment focusing on SO, personnel performing IW operations need to understand how to assess, create, sustain, and transfer the elements of state capacity to influence the outcome of conflicts or to establish security post-conflict. The influences and framing are key to developing capacities that will last long after the intervention ends. Influence drivers are those who are part of the conflict or actors (people who have ideas) and can be either positive or negative (Guttieri, 2008b, p. 13).

In the absence of institutions that can provide services for citizens, alternative groups such as terrorist organizations, religious groups, or insurgents can and will occupy the gap. For example, in Lebanon, Hezbollah removed trash and provided families with money to rebuild their homes. The U.S. can play a key role in winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population and gain their trust by working with the local government or community to provide these services. This will placate the population and enhance the legitimacy of the group responsible for providing the services (Grynkewich, 2007).

<b>State Capacity</b>	<b>External Influences</b>	<b>Influence Drivers</b>	<b>Framing</b>
Public Health	Environment	International	Culture
Economics	Climate	Organizations	Perception
Governance	Demographics	National	
Infrastructure	Natural	agencies	
Essential Services	Resources	Non-	
Agriculture		governmental	
Rule of Law		organizations	
Information Systems		Spoilers	

Table 1. Development Focus Areas (From Guttieri, 2008b, p. 13)

Regardless of its positive intentions, many in the USG government continue to perpetuate “the U.S. strategy of promoting democracy and freedom in the Middle East as the antidote to terrorism” (Sageman, 2008, pp. 147-148). In an ideal democratic society, conflict channels through the political arena instead of the physical. The general USG perception is that a “liberal democracy is the legitimate form of government and that other forms of government are not only illegitimate but transitory” (Kagan, 2007, p. 19). To the contrary, several examples around the world support the idea that post-conflict or civil war areas, and in those with a very diverse population, immediate democratic elections may undermine peace and security. For example, Bosnia’s 1996 elections, held less than a year after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, reinforced ethnic divisions instead of facilitating cooperation (Paris, 2004, pp. 101-102). While the U.S. still supports and advocates democracy, policy-makers are beginning to realize that achieving democratic governance is a step-wise process, not a single step.

As result, most of the U.S.’ current overseas deployments and missions have one primary goal: to enhance the legitimacy of the local governing structure and facilitate security and stability by garnering the support of the people and winning their “hearts and minds.” These latter operations are an integral part of the U.S.’ approach to stability operations; economic development should enhance stability and therefore encourage

peace (Mc Hugh & Gostelow, 2004, pp. 1-2). By avoiding actions and imposing values that incite the wrath and ire of the population, the U.S. may prevent the population from joining the terrorist social movement.

The U.S. Army's primary purpose used to be "to fight and win the nation's wars." The military's primary mission was not conducting reconstruction operations. The current threat environment and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a focus shift for the entire military, including the Army. Because of the military's inexperience in these types of operations, NGOs and other USG agencies such as the State Department and USAID are key partners and assets. These organizations possess the experience, funds, contacts, and neutral affiliation (compared to the uniformed military) to conduct reconstruction operations.

## **B. UNITED STATES POLICIES**

After 9/11, the USG scrambled to react to the new threat. Faced with an unfamiliar enemy and unprepared to find, fix, and locate the enemy, the USG hastily convened study groups, commissions, and reports whose goals were twofold: determine where U.S. national defense capabilities failed and evaluate possible solutions to those gaps. The doctrine and guidance that emerged reflect an overall trend focusing on the risks from ungoverned or weakly governed areas around the globe. By establishing security and control, the U.S. and its allies could prevent or locate hostile threats before they cause harm. Improving the quality of life, standard of living, and establishing responsive governance in these areas, would create a long-term trend that would last after the U.S.' intervention. The following section analyzes some of the documents for relevance to civil affairs functions, and their ability to be executed. Policies are listed in order of developmental precedence as opposed to publication date.

### **1. National Security Strategy 2002**

President Bush officially declared the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002 (Bush, 2002). The 2002 NSS emphasizes the terrorist threat and the need for the U.S. to prevent and assist failed or failing states by

facilitating and rewarding democratic institutions, alleviating poverty, and increasing economic development (Bush, 2002, pp. 4-6).

This document has several key shortcomings. First, the term “Global War on Terror” is a misnomer. One cannot wage war on “terror” or “terrorism.” These are fighting tactics. The GWOT label deceptively minimizes the number and non-state actor nature of the enemy and lumps them into one category. The second key shortfall is the emphasis on democracy as an essential vehicle to alleviate the world’s problems. While humanitarian assistance and economic development would facilitate security and strengthening of weak states’ structures, cultural differences and the ongoing politics within a nation-state may not be conducive to democracy and may worsen the situation (Paris, 2004).

In addition, while the NSS lays out lofty, vaguely defined goals such as collaboration with key allies and political and economic freedom, these tasks are neither assigned to a specific agency for responsibility, nor are the methodology to achieve the goals outlined or defined (Dale, 2008, CRS-5). This was the first document to suggest a standing cadre of civilian personnel that the USG could call on to support these goals in future U.S. interventions.

The U.S. engagements directly reflected these issues in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. military approach focused on conventional wartime solutions and a direct implementation of democratic elections, without considering the capacity of governing structures in these countries or the willingness and desire of the populations in these countries for democracy. In Iraq, for example, the U.S. failed to understand the non-state actor threat and destroyed what little government Iraq had through “de-Baathification,” alienating a substantial block of the population and forcing the U.S. to rebuild governance capacity from nothing. The confusion between the DOS and the DoD revealed the confusion among areas of responsibility and authority.

The document had another significant impact. The GWOT is a significant shift from the prior administration’s view that terrorism was a “criminal matter” in the realm

of the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Scarborough, 2004, pp. 1-2). Viewing terrorism in militant terms expanded U.S. policy options to include the use of military forces (Scarborough, 2004, pp. 1-2).

While the NSS does not specifically reference civil affairs, the types of economic, stability, and development operations to which President Bush refers are in the realm of CA personnel, especially in unstable regions of the world where foreign civilian worker and NGO presence is minimal.

## **2. National Security Strategy 2006**

The 2006 NSS was as vague as its predecessor in 2002. Reflecting similar goals to the 2002 NSS, the 2006 NSS expanded on many of the 2002 goals. This document also failed to assign responsibility or accountability to specific agencies, and failed to prioritize the goals within the document. One key addition to the 2006 NSS was an introductory section listing “successes and challenges”; Iraq and Afghanistan were included as examples of “successful” replacement of tyrannies with democracies.

## **3. National Defense Strategy 2005**

The NSS informs the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which in turn informs the national Military Strategy (NMS). The 2005 NDS “was notable for introducing a new, quadripartite categorization of global security challenges: “traditional,” “irregular,” “catastrophic,” or “disruptive” (Dale, 2008, CRS-8). This document was critical in the military’s updating its doctrine to reflect the current threat environment, exemplified by documents such as the IW-JOC.

However, similar to the 2002 and 2006 NSS’, the NDS reiterates vague goals without assigning specific responsibilities for actions to the military’s branches. The 2005 NDS does emphasize the military’s changing mission sets, including humanitarian assistance and law enforcement operations, and the need for accurate and timely intelligence (Rumsfeld, 2005, pp. 6 & 12).

#### **4. National Defense Strategy 2008**

The 2008 NDS acknowledges the need for long-term activities, partnerships with a diverse array of players, and unconventional tactics (Gates, 2008a, p. 17). Importantly, the 2008 NDS recognizes that the DoD is currently performing many of these long-term reconstruction and development missions both because of the uncertain nature of the security environment in some areas, and also because the USG lacks a civilian force ready to deploy and tackle such missions.

The 2008 NDS reinforces the NSS in stating that the USG should develop a greater, permanent civilian force from both the education field and industry. This force would alleviate the burden on military personnel and prevent unnecessary military involvement. The NDS, like the NSS, fails to address the source of funding or incentives necessary to establish such a force (Gates, 2008a, p. 17). However, the new Civilian Response Corps finally moved towards reality in July 2008, when Congress approved \$75 million in funding to support recruitment and training of a cadre of civilian personnel willing to deploy on a few weeks' notice, much like the military's reserve forces (Wanke, 2008).

#### **5. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05**

Congress and the DoD responded to the GWOT and the changing global threat with DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, published November 28, 2005. This document directs the Army to integrate stability operations (SOs) into its training in addition to conventional warfare with an emphasis as important as combat operations. Stability operations “advance U.S. interests and values” with the immediate goals to provide “the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs;” the long term goals include developing “indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society” (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 2).

While DoDD 3000.05 explicitly states that SOs are a “core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support,” it also

emphasizes the cooperative nature of the effort with international countries and militaries, NGOs, private companies, and other USG agencies (England, 2005, p. 2).

DoDD 3000.05 notes that many SO tasks are “best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals” but notes that the military should be prepared to execute these tasks when civilians cannot (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 2). This is a critical point; U.S. or foreign civilian and NGO assistance may not be readily available or willing based on the security and threat level in a given area, especially immediately after cessation of combat operations. In these types of situations and environments, the military’s CA capabilities would be one of the few alternatives. DoDD 3000.05 also fails to take into consideration that many other organizations within the USG are more doctrinally suited to SO missions<sup>9</sup>; the document assigns a dominant role to the military instead of what may be a more appropriate reinforcing role.

One of the most recent results of this directive is the establishment of the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO). DoDD 3000.05 directed the establishment of a Center of Excellence for Stability Operations. While the State Department is the lead on the CCO, the CCO is primarily funded by the DoD because DoDD 3000.05 failed to provide or to establish a source of funding to meet its intent.

## **6. National Security Presidential Directive 44**

The title of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) is “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” While this document places the Secretary of State (SOS) as the lead in all aspects of reconstruction operations, it does not provide a source of funding for the SOS to implement this capability (The White House, 2005).

This document is relevant for several reasons. First, the document highlights the importance of reconstruction operations and the degree to which interagency cooperation

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<sup>9</sup> State Department and USAID describe their mission as “advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system” (U.S. Department of State & U.S. Agency for International Development, 2007, p. 2).

will be required for success. Second, by placing the Department of State (DOS) in charge of the development, integration, and practice of reconstruction and stabilization operations, NSPD-44 emphasizes the need for skills typically outside the DoD (The White House, 2005). This document, in conjunction with Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, directly supported the development of the 1207 Program, which authorized the DoD to send the DOS funds for security, reconstruction, and stabilization (Perito, 2008, p. 1). These monies served to “jump-start” the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) (Perito, 2008, p. 1).

## **7. 2008 National Military Strategy**

The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the NSS and implements the NDS. This most recent assessment fully takes into account the different current and emerging threats around the world. Published before Russia’s invasion into Georgia in August 2008, it accurately predicted Russia’s burgeoning hegemonic intentions. However, this document fails to outline a methodology by which the DoD will prepare for the new threats.

## **8. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review**

Based on the 2005 NDS, the 2006 QDR is the first developed with the U.S. actively at war. The 2006 QDR focuses on the IW threat and increasing the military’s capability to face and to address these threats using an indirect approach while retaining its ability to face conventional threats (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 11). This is the only document to quantify a change in force requirements in several areas, including SOF; the QDR delineates augmenting CA and Psychological Operations (PO) forces by 3,700, an increase of 33% (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 45).

This document had a significant impact in several ways. It was one of the first documents to emphasize the need for decision-making reform, and effectively implemented significant changes in the military’s force structure. Since the release of the 2006 QDR, the Army successfully augmented the CA, PO, and SF, phasing the ultimate goal over several years (Lamb & Lachow, 2006, p. 1).

## **9. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept**

The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) published in 2007 is one of the first comprehensive guides for U.S. IW military strategy, doctrine, and organization. This document emphasizes the long-term nature of involvement in IW, and the need for a “whole-of-government” (not just military) and people-oriented approach to IW threats: “IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. 6).

The IW-JOC notes, among other risks, that “operating in an ambiguous IW environment will create new mental and physiological demands on personnel conducting long-term assignments in foreign austere settings” requiring operators to “exercise communicating, persuading, and negotiating skills using the members’ language proficiency, cultural knowledge, and cross-cultural communications skills” (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. 38).

## **10. Field Manual 3-0: Operations**

While FM 3-0 is a significant improvement over the latest version published prior to 9-11 in June 2001, this manual still has significant shortfalls. FM 3-0 positively reflects importance of working in a joint military and interagency environment within and through local populations to affect change. However, it still reflects the Army’s concept of “full spectrum operations” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008a, p. vii). The operational continuum parallels the “spectrum of conflict,” and implies that the military can and should scale its operations according to the severity of the conflict (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008a, pp. 2-1 to 2-3).




Figure 4. The Spectrum of Conflict (From Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008a)

This terminology and perspective are misleading. Figure 4 assumes that stable peace, unstable peace, insurgency, and general war are a direct progression of violence. Unstable peace may never escalate to insurgency or general war, but the diagram leads to the conclusion that the military needs to expend less resources to fight an insurgency than a general war, for example. The fallacy of this argument is that the same forces and the same skills can adapt to each situation, when different skills sets and equipment may be required at each level. This view is extremely limited in scope and fails to see military strategy as an adjunct to long-term political strategy.

## 11. Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency Manual

The new Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, FM 3-24 (2006) is significant for its integration of lessons from past insurgencies and shortfalls. While the manual provides useful “how-to” tips at the operator level, such as pay and equipping considerations when establishing local and national security forces, the true importance of the manual is that it reflects an overall paradigm shift in the military and governmental approach to COIN and the shift from direct firepower and destruction to personal interaction with the local environment (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006a).

This manual is augmented by a new draft COIN manual directed at government agencies other than the military, which emphasizes a concerted interagency approach to COIN operations (U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2007, p. 8). This formalizes the cooperative nature of conducting COIN operations by leveraging the capabilities and assets of the entire USG.

## 12. Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations

FM 3-07 builds on the foundation of FM 3-0 and FM 3-24, Stability Operations and Support Operations, and COIN, respectively. FM 3-07 is an integral step in the doctrinal development of SO. Critically, the FM recognizes that “contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008b, p. 1-1). The FM describes a planning framework developed by an interagency group led by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to focus planning efforts.

This FM is especially useful because it provides a baseline and basis as well as specific recommended tasks to achieve the desired goals. Figure 6 illustrates the integration of SO tasks into the full spectrum operations described in FM 3-0. The FM is significant in that it emphasizes and describes operations coordinated in conjunction with interagency partners such as the DOS.




Figure 5. An integrated approach to stability operations (From Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008b, p. 2-5)

## 13. Policy Summary and Recommendations

Table 2 summarizes the key findings of the policy analysis. Together, these policies reflect the USG's strategy to combat terrorism and to prepare the DoD and DOS for the IW threat. As more time passed after 9/11 and because of the numerous studies and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the USG adapted its strategy. The new strategy focuses on stability operations, with economic development, and establishing or restoring

essential services and infrastructure. The change in focus has significant impact for those in the USG who conduct these types of operations, including CA officers. Organizing economic development efforts across a country or a province requires advanced education, coordination with agencies foreign and domestic, cultural awareness, and language capabilities.

	Policy	Year	Primary Objective	Civil Affairs Implications
1	National Security Strategy (NSS)	2002	Declaration of GWOT	Emphasis on democracy as vehicle for preventing terrorism
2	National Security Strategy (NSS)	2006	Reiterate U.S. role as world leader in alleviating and preventing conflict	Methodology? Responsible agencies not identified
3	National Defense Strategy (NDS)	2005	Officially introduced new terminology to military lexicon	No designation of priorities or responsibilities
4	National Defense Strategy (NDS)	2008	Economic development, FID, create deployable civilian force	Initial lack of funding and incentives; Civilian Corps recruitment initiated July 08
5	National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44)	2005	Interagency cooperation vital to R & S	No funding source to implement; financial support from DoD via 1207 Program
6	National Military Strategy	2008	Adapt to new threats but retain some conventional capability	Long term plan to support both UW and conventional needs?
7	Quadrennial Defense Review	2006	Focus on IW threat	Increased force sizes for SOF, including CA
8	Department of Defense Directive 3000.05	2005	Elevates SOs to core DoD mission; establish center of excellence	Military CA recommended for insecure areas, CCO created
9	Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept	2007	Acknowledges need to consider civilian population	Need for different skill set; adjust future military training and focus
10	Field Manual 3.0	2008	Increased emphasis on joint and interagency	Assumes same force can conduct all missions
11	COIN Manual	2006	Fills doctrinal gap, update lessons learned	Provides basic guidelines, emphasizes need for IA and situational assessments
12	Stability Operations Manual	2008	Fills doctrinal gap, update lessons learned	Provides detailed framework, emphasizes need for IA, time, and careful assessments

Table 2. Key United States Policy and Doctrine and Implications for Civil Affairs

New field manuals, training courses, and military policies integrate many of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq and the language of COIN and SO. The new COIN FM and addition of these concepts to military schools are examples. The military is adapting in other ways, as well. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps disseminated public statements that officers serving on a Military Transition Team<sup>10</sup> or

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<sup>10</sup> A Military Transition Team (MTT) is a group of military personnel assigned to assist a foreign unit in developing its skills, tactics, and unit cohesion to operate independently successfully eventually.

PRTs learn skills critical for the services' future and that these billets are equally competitive as other "key and developmental"<sup>11</sup> assignments when officers are assessed for promotion (Johnson, 2008; Lopez, 2008). This illustrates that the USG and its agencies understand that they must change and adapt to ensure that the U.S. is ready to fight or to prevent the next fight, wherever and whenever that may be.

Future policy and doctrine need to integrate the "five Ws": who, what, where, when, why, and how. Current documents lack the means to force change throughout the USG, especially those directed at the DoD and DOS. Without funds, controls, or incentives to support organizational changes, authorities, and a strong lead organization synchronizing efforts, new doctrine and policy are merely words on a piece of paper. Without a clear purpose and intent that both Congress and the Executive Branch understand, change will be slow, and potentially ineffective. To force rapid change, Congressional buy-in and legislation must support Presidential directives; only through a coordinated effort will USG agencies alter their focus and the way they conduct operations. (J. Q. Wilson, 1989)

### **C. CONCLUSION: THE CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITY DEMAND**

The military's CA officers play a key role in both the current and future threat environment. All current events and historical markers point to non-state actors, failed states, and trans-national terrorists as the current threat and that of the foreseeable future. The U.S. views its role as both a peacekeeper and a tool to effect change in nations and areas struggling to handle these threats. Based on recent USG policy and doctrine, peacekeeping, SO, and CI operations are the U.S.' tools of choice to support and enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of areas facing these problems. CA operations play an integrated role in campaign plans designed to reduce support for the enemy by positively influencing different population segments.

These diverse requirements require an equally diverse set of skills for CA officers to operate successfully in varied environments. CA forces must work closely with the

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<sup>11</sup> "Key and Developmental (KD)" assignments are those listed in AR 600-3 that an Army officer must complete prior to consideration for promotion to the next grade.

local population and local governing structures to evaluate and determine priorities and therefore must have an in-depth cultural and linguistic capability to ensure positive relations and clear understanding of goals and intent. The goal is to meet the needs of the assisted society, not to impose U.S. values: “It will...require the U.S. to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests” (Huntington, 1993, p. 49). Regardless of exact implementation, “the nature of current missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere requires military officers to appreciate the nuances of national policy and work closely with civilian officials, other militaries, and civilians from intergovernmental and non governmental agencies” (Guttieri, 2006, pp. 340-341).

Evaluating the skills required in the current threat environment and stability tasks such as those in Figure 5 leads to Table 3, which highlights some of the key tasks and skills that CA officers will need in this current and future threat environment.

Understand and integrate information operations
Assess and implement plans to support environmental security
Assess and implement plans to support global health concerns and issues
Operate in complex environments
Conduct and coordinate stability operations
Conduct and coordinate humanitarian assistance / disaster relief
Conduct and coordinate prevention operations
Conduct negotiations and develop consensus
Form hasty networks
Support conventional force operations
Integrate plans into cultural environment
Long term economic development

Table 3. CA Skills and Tasks Needed for the Current and Future Threat  
(After Guttieri, 2008b)

The U.S. will not relinquish its dominant role in the world anytime soon. To the contrary, countries around the world are content to let the U.S. serve as the world’s

peacekeeper, ensuring security both on the water and on the ground, and expect the U.S. to intervene around the world at the first hint of a conflict that could impact the world's economic security and well-being (Kagan, 2007).

As with many of the other areas of the military, many of the roles and jobs CA personnel currently perform differ from those in the past, while others are similar to prior conflicts. The USG uses CA officers for a variety of functions at all levels of the military hierarchy, where they act as planners, coordinators, and liaisons with host nation representatives and external agencies.

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### III. CIVIL AFFAIRS EDUCATION AND PRACTICE

Chapter II illustrated that the military's mission in the near future will include irregular warfare. These missions will require more engagement on the civil dimension, increasing the relevance of Civil Affairs roles as described in Chapter I. This chapter focuses on Civil Affairs educational pipeline and current operational practices. Each step in an officer's career path should prepare him or her for the next level of responsibility and the next mission.

One of the greatest challenges that the military faces is the multitude of missions assigned to it. Conventional warfare and IW require much different skills sets and knowledge. While the military acknowledges the importance of IW, many leaders are reluctant to focus on IW, for several reasons:

- 1) Integrating or changing existing curricula will divert attention from conventional warfare, and if these skills atrophy, then the military may be caught unprepared (Tyson, 2008).
- 2) Most of the military's current senior leaders emerged in a conventional environment focused on heavy, technology-driven combat power; they are uncomfortable and unfamiliar with much of the terminology, practice, and application of IW to the modern battlefield.
- 3) The U.S. is severely risk averse. The military tends to focus on technology versus tactics to reduce the need to place personnel in jeopardy. For example, instead of emphasizing language and cultural awareness for human intelligence collection, the U.S. approach was to focus on remote collection capabilities such as satellites and listening devices (O'Connell, 1997). While this technology provides useful data on large troop and equipment movements, such as during the Cold War, this technology is not nearly as effective in remote jungles or in cities where the enemy and the population look the same. Another example of risk aversion is the focus on armored vehicles and remote missile delivery systems. This technology physically separates the war fighter from both the

enemy and the population. The result may be fewer U.S. casualties, but more innocent civilian deaths and property destruction, which can ultimately sabotage U.S. efforts to combat an insurgency.

Even with supporting reports as early as 2004 stating “The service secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into the services’ professional military education programs,” the military is reluctant to accept DoDD 3000.05 assigning SO the same importance as combat operations (Defense Science Board, 2004, p. vii).

The key to overcoming the self-imposed limitations on the U.S. military is to effectively train and utilize organic IW capabilities such as CA. The majority of CA officers are in the U.S. Army. This chapter explores the Army’s common officer educational pipeline, and then focus on CA specific education. The goal of this chapter is to determine what skills and knowledge CA officers learn throughout their careers. Chapter IV will compare the results of this chapter with the demand gap from Chapter II to assess what, if any, shortfalls exist in the CA officer educational pipeline.

#### **A. THE ARMY’S PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PIPELINE**

The Army educates its officers through three methods: institutional training<sup>12</sup>, operational assignments, and self-development<sup>13</sup>. Education is distinct from training in that “*Education* implies the transmission of knowledge and skills required for effectiveness, as opposed to *training* “to perform specific functions, tasks, or missions” (Guttieri, 2006, pp. 318-319). However, both are essential for to develop a professional military officer capable of making informed and reasonable decisions to support a commander’s intent.

The Army first focuses on a common core to inculcate its officers with certain knowledge and skills, and then diversifies within specific branches. Some of the skills and knowledge may apply to any military situation, such as leadership and problem solving. Other skills, such as tactics and branch-specific technical skills, may apply only

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<sup>12</sup> Institutional training takes place in military and/or civilian institutions.

<sup>13</sup> Self-development may be through distance learning, professional reading, or individual study.

to specific career fields. This section focuses on the knowledge and skills imparted throughout the educational pipeline through which all officers must travel.

The Professional Military Education (PME) requirements for all Army officers are similar throughout the branches. PME focuses on the basic skills, characteristics, and knowledge that all Army officers need. PME is also oriented at problem solving skills to create flexible and adaptable leaders who can react to changes and make decisions with limited information. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 22)

## **1. Basic Officer Leadership Course**

Currently, all newly commissioned Army lieutenants in all branches attend a common course focusing on weapons proficiency, tactics, and convoys, called the Basic Officer Leadership Course II (BOLC). Subsequently, each accession<sup>14</sup> Army branch has its own junior officer instruction course called BOLIC III, which highlights branch-specific knowledge and skills (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 24).

BOLC serves two very critical functions for junior officers. First, it establishes a baseline of knowledge, which the Army expects all new lieutenants to have. Second, it introduces junior leaders to basic Army operations, including organization, tactics, and doctrine. At this stage of development, the Army expects junior officers to receive mentorship and development within their units from both their experienced senior noncommissioned officers and senior officers.

## **2. Captain's Career Course**

The next step in the educational pipeline is the Captain's Career Course (CCC). Like BOLIC, the CCC is aimed at junior officers. The CCC prepares junior leaders to command at the company, battery, or troop level and to perform as staff officers at the battalion and brigade level. Reserve officers can complete CCC training in one of two ways: by attending the active duty CCC, or by attending a Reserve CCC “which consists

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<sup>14</sup> An “accession” branch in one to which the Army can assign a newly commissioned lieutenant, other branches, such as CA, Psyops, and SF, select personnel from other branches at later points in an officer’s career.

of two, two-week ADTs (Active Duty for Training) spaced one year apart, plus up to 295 hours of advanced distributed learning" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 24).

A recent change to the CCC is the addition of a distance learning Phase I Captains' Career Common Core Course (C5) designed to "provide a series of critical skills grounded in leadership, communication, composite risk management, critical reasoning/thinking and developing a positive command climate" (Army News Service, 2007). While the Army introduced this change in 2007, the C5 fails to reflect many of the shortfalls or lessons learned indicated by current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Table 4 shows the current tasks required. Only two of the tasks listed in Table 4, numbers 05 and 19, significantly emphasize operations in foreign theaters.

Task Title	Time
02 - Conduct a change of primary hand receipt holder inventory	2.00
04 - Supervise the implementation of the Composite Risk Management process at company level	2.30
05 - Enforce company compliance with the host nation, federal state and local environmental laws and regulations	2.60
06 - Supervise the implementation of the Army's drug abuse prevention/control program	5.00
12 - Establish a positive command climate	4.70
13 - Identify the legal implications of the homosexual conduct policy	1.00
18 - Manage a unit counseling program	4.50
19 - Implement measures to reduce operational stress	3.00
Total Time	25.10

Table 4. C5 Tasks and Time to Complete (From Institutional Leader Development Division, 2008)

While each CCC teaches some branch specific skills, most of the CCCs emphasize class room instruction utilizing PowerPoint slides. Some CCCs incorporate in-class exercises and presentations, but field time is rare. Each CCC culminates in a

combined arms exercise<sup>15</sup> (CAX), but given that each CCC is branch or area specific, the “combined” aspect is minimal (Institutional Leader Development Division, 2007). For example, the signal CCC has only signal officers, so the exercise lacks input from the other military branches and will focus on the signal area of support and operations. This is a critical shortfall; many officers feel inadequately prepared to operate and interact within a battalion or brigade staff (R. Lewis, personal communication, October 9, 2008; M. Metzger, personal communication, October 9, 2008; F. Smith, personal communication, October 6, 2008). Because other branches, especially combat arms, rarely interact with the smaller, specialized branches such as CA, combat arms officers may fail to appreciate their utility to an operation.

### **3. Intermediate Level Education**

#### *a. Active Duty*

The next phase of the educational pipeline is Intermediate Level Education (ILE), which senior captains and majors attend. ILE consists of two phases. The first is a three month phase of Army common core (CC) knowledge and doctrine, while the second phase is a seven month course called the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC). This Master’s level course develops officers’ “abilities to conduct full spectrum operations in joint, multinational, and interagency environments; and to develop the requisite competencies to serve successfully as staff officers at division level and above” (Bralley, Danley, French, Soby, & Tiberi, 2003). ILE is focused on teaching students “how (versus what) to think, problem solving and decision-making,” to facilitate their future “service at division, corps, echelons above corps (EAC), land component command (LCC), and joint staffs” (Bralley et al., 2003). All Army officers must complete the common core, but only select branches (of which CA is one) must complete the entire ten month block.

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<sup>15</sup> The Army used to send all officers to Combined Arms Staff Course (CASQ), but eliminated this CCC follow-on course because of the costs.

The curriculum developers recently integrated Stability Operations into the CC and AOWC curriculums because of DoDD 3000.05. AOWC emphasizes stability operations into its three capstone exercises built around potential real-world scenarios, all integrating stability operations at the joint, division, and brigade levels (D. Clark, personal communication, November 19, 2008). The developers constantly update and revise the curriculum based on DA guidance, student feedback, and current operations. While significant changes and revisions can take six months to integrate, developers can integrate minor changes within 48 hours (D. Clark, personal communication, November 19, 2008).

*b. Reserve*

The Reserve side of the military has the option of attending ILE either in residence or via distance learning or education (DE)<sup>16</sup>. The reservist has a choice of two different versions of the nonresident version of the course. The student takes the “S” format course online, with periodic written requirements administered through the Command and General Staff College Department of Distance Education (DDE) (U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 2007). The second option is the “M” format of the course; The Army School System (TASS<sup>17</sup>) training battalions administer the course at remote locations around the world. This version of the course involves some DE and advance preparation in addition to the on-site training (U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 2007).

Both of these options have drawbacks. Many students complain about DE’s quality and effectiveness, especially courses conducted completely online without any human interaction or feedback. Some Reserve units may favor distance education, however; because DE is free, and resident or TASS courses cost the unit both travel and fees to attend the course (J. Owens, personal communication, October 30, 2008). TASS courses also have several potential shortfalls. If students do not receive the study

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<sup>16</sup> Active duty personnel may complete ILE through distance learning only by exception.

<sup>17</sup> TASS battalions primarily train Reserve and National Guard personnel.

materials in advance<sup>18</sup>, they cannot prepare for the course and may not fully benefit from the class time. The regional TASS may have to cancel classes because of a lack of enrolled students or qualified instructors.

In addition, the DE and TASS courses cannot match the resident course because remote locations lack access to the exercise systems; straight DE lacks the advantage of group and team interactions. This problem may improve in the near future, as CGSC is creating a blended campus that will combine asynchronous and synchronous DE with on-site time (D. Clark, personal communication, November 19, 2008).

The ILE CC is required for promotion to LTC, while both CC and AOWC are required for promotion to COL (U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 2007). Many Reserve officers reach their 20-year retirement point at the grade of major, and may therefore have little incentive or initiative to complete ILE if they intend to retire before consideration to LTC and COL (G. Woodson, personal communication, October 18, 2008).

Though all majors are technically required to complete ILE, neither the reserve units nor the RC CA career manager enforces prompt ILE attendance upon promotion to major (K. Brown, personal communication, October 9, 2008; J.K. Owens, personal communication, October 30, 2008; G. Woodson, personal communication, October 18, 2008). This may be a serious issue because RC majors are in demand more than ever before to support conflicts around the world. If both the CC and AWOC teach critical staff and decision-making skills, then not completing these courses in advance of deploying may hinder the functionality and utility of RC CA officers.

#### **4. Senior Service College (SSC)**

The military offers several schools for its senior officers to prepare them for command and leadership in strategic and joint positions (Headquarters, Department of the

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<sup>18</sup> The student may be unprepared because he was enrolled in the course late, leaving insufficient time to receive and process the materials; his unit fails to receive the materials from the school but not get them to the student on time; or the unit may fail to supervise the student, not ensuring that he is qualified with the prerequisite skills needed for the course, or failed to enforce standards on the student.

Army, 2007, p. 9). Selected military officers can attend the Army War College, Air War College or apply for fellowships to attend programs at over 13 different accredited and approved institutions ("Senior leader development: growing strategic leaders for the 21st century," 2008).

## B. CIVIL AFFAIRS EDUCATION AND DOCTRINE

Figure 6 illustrates a CA officer's professional development path and options.




Figure 6. Civil Affairs Officer Continuum (After Guttieri, 2008b, p. 11)

### 1. Formal Military Education

The Civil Affairs branch is a non-accession branch, so its officers come from other branches as senior lieutenants or captains instead of commissioning directly as CA officers. Serving in the conventional Army branches provides CA officers with small unit leadership experience and familiarization with conventional Army tactics and methods (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 181).

The Army expects its CA officers to complete their basic branch CCC, located at the branches' home stations throughout the U.S. All CA officers attend the CA qualification course (CAQC), designed to teach "the necessary skills and technical qualifications to perform the duties required" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 23). The CA qualification course covers specific regional and cultural information, branch-specific skills, and language training, as illustrated in Figure 7. Table 5 details the CA core tasks instructed during the CAQC. The U.S. Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USASWC) is the primary proponent of CA doctrine and teaches the active duty CAQC.

Appendix D lists the classes instructed during the CAQC; the CA proponent at SWC would not release the specific program of instruction (POI) details. The classes consist mostly of tactical CA skills for the company grade CA officer and do not address the operational or strategic levels of CA operations.

The Advanced Regional Analysis Course teaches CA officers how to analyze their operational environment by collecting and managing key data "through instruction in the nonlethal targeting process, effects-based planning and the system-of-systems approach, which includes all elements of national power, i.e., diplomatic, informational, military and economic. The training also introduces officers to net-centric warfare, civil-information management and 'interagency awareness' and training" to support the requirements of DoDD 3000.05 and DoD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (Myskey, 2007, p. 31). This is a significant step in achieving the goal of integrated Civil Information Management (CIM).

Because USACAPOC controls and manages the Army's Reserve forces, Reserve CA personnel attend a separate CA course, USAR CA Officer Course, as shown in Figure 8 (Burton, 2008, p. 8). The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) (3<sup>rd</sup> Bn, 1<sup>st</sup> SWTG) conducts the Reserve CAQC. The Reserve CA course does not incorporate a language requirement.




Figure 7. Active Duty Civil Affairs Qualification Course (From Secretary General Staff, 2007)

The 1st Training Brigade conducts the predeployment training for all activated Reserve CA personnel preparing to deploy (J. Owens, personal communication, October 30, 2008). While the 1st Training Brigade's personnel are trained and certified to instruct and use the curricula and materials SWC developed, the 1st Training Brigade is composed primarily of infantry personnel who rarely have CA backgrounds or experience, which may be that case with many individual augmentees<sup>19</sup> (J. Owens, personal communication, October 30, 2008). Prior experience of instructors in an area of instruction contributes to instructor credibility and effectiveness, especially when many individual augmentees lack any other CA training or experience.

The active duty and Reserve courses intersect in the final phase of both courses, for the field exercise (FTX) called "Operation Certain Trust" (Burton, 2008, p. 10). This FTX integrates real-world scenarios with the CA officers' new knowledge and skills from

<sup>19</sup> Individual augmentees are reserve military personnel who may not belong to a unit but because of operational requirements or personnel shortfalls are recalled to Active duty and deployed with or to join an existing unit.

the CAQC (Burton, 2008, p. 10). While the CAQC curriculum is constantly under revision, CA officers who completed the course as recently as 2003 observed that the scenarios were very scripted and simplistic, focusing more on operations in Bosnia than more recent operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (R. Lewis, personal communication, October 9, 2008). The scenarios portrayed CA officers' role in theater as conducting jobs that leaders could not logically assign to another proponent, leaving the new CA officers without a clear idea of their role during deployments (R. Lewis, personal communication, October 9, 2008; M. Metzger, personal communication, October 9, 2008). Training was also less effective because it was a CA-pure exercise and did not involve any other forces but CA. Performing CA functions out of context with other military forces fails to reinforce many of the CA core tasks, especially those that involve staff work and coordination.

Civil Information Management
Civil Reconnaissance
Support to Civil Administration
Nation Assistance
Military Civic Action
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Populace and Resources Control
Dislocated Civilian Operations
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Table 5. Civil Affairs Officer Core Tasks and Skills (Lieutenant and Captain) (From Secretary General Staff, 2007)

While the military bureaucracy takes time to process and integrate lessons learned, USG policy and doctrine post 9/11 emphasized the importance and utility of CA forces to furthering the U.S.' foreign policy goals. To support these ends, the CAQC needs to constantly adapt and update its curriculum. With the high demand on Reserve CA officers and their overlapping responsibilities with active duty CA officers, SWC should ensure that the Reserve and Active duty curriculums are closely connected.




Figure 8. Reserve Civil Affairs Officer Training Course (From Burton, 2008, p. 9)

## 2. Optional Education

The military affords many military officers the opportunity to attend a graduate level program to earn a Master's degree in a field that will support or enhance military capability and support the higher educational goals of its outstanding officers. The Army calls this program "Advanced Civil Schooling<sup>20</sup> (ACS)" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, pp. 27-28).

The Army's Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the organization that controls all Army CA personnel, affords many of its members the opportunity to attend a fully funded graduate education program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). SOCOM sponsors and provides significant funding for the NPS Defense Analysis (DA) program.

<sup>20</sup> Programs typically last one year and up to 18 months. The officer incurs an active duty service obligation (ADSO); the officer must remain on active duty for a specified period following degree completion, and the assignment manager may place the officer in a specific assignment to take advantage of his/her new knowledge.

<b>Educational Skill Requirements for DA Program at NPS</b>
Strategy and Policy
The Dynamics of Inter-State and Intra-State Conflict
Terrorism, Social Revolution, and Unconventional Warfare
Historical and Comparative Perspectives on Special Operations
Special Operations Doctrine, Concepts, and Institutions
Crisis Management and the Contingent Use of Military Power
Comparative Cases of and Responses to Regional Conflict
Special Operations and the Revolution in Military Affairs
Special Operations and Information Warfare
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation
Analytical Methods and Applications
Strategic and Operational Complexity

Table 6. Educational Skill Requirements for Defense Analysis Program at NPS (From "Naval Postgraduate School General Catalog," 2008)

The Special Operations/Irregular Warfare curriculum<sup>21</sup> has a track designed for CA officers called "National Security Affairs (Stability/Reconstruction)" ("Naval Postgraduate School General Catalog," 2008). Graduates earn a Master's of Science in Defense Analysis, designated with the National Security Affairs (Stability/Reconstruction) specialty track<sup>22</sup>. Earning a degree at NPS alleviates a CA officer of the requirement to complete the seven-month phase of ILE. NPS is one of many schooling opportunities, and the Defense Analysis department is the only one with a curriculum that specializes in Special Operations.

ACS is an outstanding opportunity for any Civil Affairs officer to both increase knowledge and hone analytical skills. Unfortunately, few active duty and even fewer Reserve CA officers receive any advanced civil schooling.

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<sup>21</sup> According to the NPS catalog, the "Special Operations/Irregular Warfare curriculum provides a focused course of instruction in irregular warfare, sub-state conflict, terrorism and counterterrorism, and other "high leverage" operations in U.S. defense and foreign policy. The core program also provides every student with a strong background in strategic analysis, decision modeling, organization theory, and formal analytical methods" ("Naval Postgraduate School General Catalog," 2008)

<sup>22</sup> While the NSA Stability Reconstruction Track is designed for CA officers, CA officers attending NPS are not mandated to complete this particular curriculum. The Defense Analysis Department offers several other concentrations.

### **3. Civil Affairs Functional Specialists**

The formal CA educational pipeline does not provide education for functional specialists.<sup>23</sup> Functional specialists, found only in the USAR, theoretically acquire their skills through their civilian jobs or through self-development (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b). The SWC or other institutions do not provide additional training to CA personnel to qualify or develop them as functional specialists.

### **4. Civil Affairs Doctrine**

Civil Affairs doctrine is evolving rapidly and the USASWC personnel routinely seek feedback to improve manuals and bring them in line with current operations. Many of the most relevant documents reflect current operations and the expanded application of CA to operations around the world and across the spectrum of operations.

#### ***a. JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations Jul 2008***

The most recent version of the Joint CMO manual stresses the essential integration of CMO at all levels of planning and execution. Figure 9 shows a phasing model of a typical operation. While CMO is a consideration during phases 0-III, CMO play a critical role in phase IV and V, during which U.S. forces prepare to depart and must successfully shift authority to the appropriate civil authorities (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-8).

This one of the first documents to assign the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) with the lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-7). In addition, the guide clarifies staff and commander responsibilities in CA areas. This is a tremendous improvement over previous doctrine in which CA were not well integrated with combat operations and were considered independent instead of supporting forces.

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<sup>23</sup> The Army qualifies medical and legal personnel as CA assets, but a different branches and proponents manage them.




Figure 9. Phasing Model (From Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008b, p. I-8)

**b. *FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations Sep 2006***

FM 3-05.40 is one of the most important of the CA doctrinal manuals. This FM delineates specific roles and responsibilities for CA personnel at every operational level and within each organization. One of the key aspects of this FM is the distinction in the expectations and responsibilities at the tactical versus the operational and strategic level. The CA branch assigns most of the tactical roles leading CATs or managing CMOCs to CA captains. Branch usually assigns CA field grade officers to higher level staff positions, which require a different skill set and knowledge.

The FM provides clearly utilized AARs and lessons learned from previous operations to highlight essential skills. For example, one of the most recent additions to the CA toolset is Civil Information Management (CIM). During OIF, CA personnel clearly identified this area as a shortfall (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 3-18). This FM provides a wealth of information for the CA manager to plan, conduct, and explain CA operations.

The major shortfall with this FM is the failure to distinguish between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of CA. The FM has some information and references to different organizational echelons operating at the different levels, but never explains the distinction in conduct, intent, and execution at the different levels. One of

the greatest current CA operational shortfalls is the constant emphasis on tactical CA versus the operational and strategic. This FM does not contribute to correcting that problem.

*c. FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures  
Jul 2007*

This FM provides detailed information on conducting CA assessments and the developing plans and provides the tools and the “how-to” to conduct CA operations, but is not a step by step guide. This distinction is extremely important. Each environment in which CA forces operate is unique and distinct and each situation will be different. The framework and planning tools that this FM provides form a strong basis from which CA officers can work, especially when they need to justify or explain their suggestions and recommendations to leaders inexperienced in dealing with CA forces and operations.

The FM clearly describes the various factors to consider when conducting the assessment or developing the CA annex are informational and clear. This will significantly aid inexperienced CA practitioners. This FM also clarifies the different CA levels, explaining tactical, operational, and strategic considerations and sample objectives at each level.

The appendices to the FM detail many of the supporting tasks that CA officers need to perform, including using interpreters, negotiation and mediation, and financial and project management, among other key topics. FM 3-05.40 noted many of these topics as operational shortfalls from AARs and other feedback from the field.

*d. Summary*

The newest CA doctrine increasingly reflects current operational requirements as well as the future threat environment. According to the SWC CA doctrine proponent, many of the outdated manuals are currently in the process of revision. Even recently revised publications are still subject to feedback and review. The CA Foreign Assistance Planning Guide, for example, though published in 2005, is scheduled for review and updates starting in 2008. Table 7 summarizes some of the

recent key and significant CA doctrine available today. A notable exception to the currency of these publications is the Officer Foundation Standards II CA Officer's Manual dated 2004. The manual defines the skills encompassed in the book as those key tasks instructed at CAQC. Much of the feedback from current CA officers indicates that the CA core tasks need revision and updating to correspond with current operational requirements.

Manual	Year	Purpose	Comments
1 JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations	2008	Essential integration of CMO at all levels of planning and execution	One of the first documents to assign the DOS' CRS with the lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations
2 FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations	2006	Distinction is expectation and responsibilities at the tactical versus the operational and strategic levels	Utilized AARs and lessons learned from previous operations; added core task of Civil Information Management (CIM)
3 FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures	2007	How to conduct CA assessments and develop plans	Clarifies tactical, operational, and strategic considerations
4 GTA 41-01-001 Civil Affairs Planning And Execution Guide	2008	Multifunctional guide that encompasses common soldier and staff officer tasks and information	Miniature version of the one-stop guide to "how to be a CA person"
5 GTA 41-01-003 Civil Affairs Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning Guide	2005	Contingency of a natural disaster or other man-made occurrence that leads to an urgent requirement to assist a population	Assists a CA operator to rapidly switch from one type of mission to another without having to conduct significant research
6 GTA 41-01-004 Joint Civil Affairs Operations And Joint Civil-Military Operations Planning Guide	2007	Assist those conducting CA and CMO in a joint environment	Planning considering and joint staff expectations of CA personnel
7 STP 41-38II-OFS Officer Foundation Standards II Civil Affairs (38) Officer's Manual	2004	Critical company grade officer skills first trained in CAQC	Does not incorporate guerilla warfare, hearts and minds, purpose of CA actions

Table 7. Current CA Doctrine and Publications

## C. TACTICAL CIVIL AFFAIRS

One of the best means of education is on-the-job training (OJT). As many military officers will attest, classroom learning and knowledge application are often completely different. This is especially true of officers entering a new career field. As previously mentioned, CA is a non-accession branch. Unless an officer has civilian experience, worked with CA while deployed, or served as an enlisted CA soldier, a new CA officer has little experience with CA operations. While the CAQC does incorporate a CA field exercise, seeing CA out of the context of other staff members and military elements minimizes the utility of the field exercises and fails to teach CA officers their roles and

responsibilities effectively. As a result, until they deploy, many new CA officers lack a true appreciation of their roles and functions and learn by doing.

### **1. Civil Affairs Teams Supporting Battalions and Brigades**

The first job of most junior CA officers is a CA tactical team leader. CATs operate primarily at the tactical level, which, as described in Chapter I, focuses on immediate needs such as food, water, and shelter, then on strengthening or improving local services and infrastructure to support and enhance the legitimacy of local governing structures and other elements of state capacity as shown in Table 3 in Chapter II. Activities include digging wells, and constructing or rebuilding bridges, schools, or medical facilities.

Most the Civil Affairs personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan were and are employed as tactical CA. Their primary focus is small projects that garner positive publicity and earn support for the Coalition forces. Teams assist local civilian governments, IGOs, and NGOs to meet the population's immediate needs, and lessen the impact of military operations while enhancing self-sufficiency (Meares, 2008, p. 8).

CATs must work closely with local leaders to address the needs and wants of the local population. Ideally, the projects CA officers facilitate should be “a locally generated concept executed by local workers and partially funded by the civil affairs team to give the population a sense of ownership” and to improve self-sufficiency (Meares, 2008).

Unfortunately, depending on the unit supporting an area, a lack of support or coordination may minimize CAT effectiveness. As a non-lethal asset, many combat arms leaders give CA little credence in their ability to improve the security situation, or fail to understand how to support CA units and integrate them into the unit's overall strategy. For example, one CA company assigned to support a brigade lacked both administrative and security support (Orbock, 2005). Fulfilling and managing these requirements out-of-hide reduced the number of CA personnel available for CA missions (Orbock, 2005).

## **2. Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs)**

CMOCs usually operate in an area support role supporting a brigade or a division. CMOCs coordinate the efforts of the regional CATs, IGOs, and NGOs working within the area (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 2-5). The CMOC rarely has direct command and control over any of the elements that it supports or coordinates (R. Lewis, personal communication, October 9, 2008). Instead, the CMOC may serve mainly in an information management role, collecting and passing information (not necessarily intelligence) among the organizations it supports and coordinates (F. Smith, personal communication, October 7, 2008).

This role coordinating and deconflicting is extremely important. Military CA efforts should complement those of IGOs and NGOs working locally, and avoid overlap or sabotage. For example, if an NGO is working to construct a sewer system, if the U.S. is working on a similar effort in a neighboring area, the two systems should be compatible and if necessary share resources and coordinate planning and execution. These organizations also can share information on local preferences and needs so that CA can facilitate linking organizations most suited to performing a given humanitarian mission with the need.

Integrating and coordinating CA efforts into a greater U.S. strategy to affect a specific result is a challenge. Conducting miscellaneous projects that the local government cannot support when the intervention is over are pointless. For example, building a power plant and failing to ensure sufficient local support to maintain the facility, or building a factory when the area lacks sufficient or consistent power. The U.S. effort should have a desired end-state or goal such as establishing a functioning state, or reinforcing existing governing structures. A lack of coordination with other projects and goals may lead to ultimate and overall failure of the entire intervention.

## **3. Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are “joint teams of international civilian and military personnel, operating at the provincial level...that undertake activities in the

areas of security, reconstruction, support to central governance and limited relief operations" (Mc Hugh & Gostelow, 2004, p. 1). The goal of PRTs is to decentralize support and operations to reach rural areas and to integrate the population into the reconstruction process. PRTs are currently operating only in Afghanistan and Iraq. Different countries around the world sponsor PRTs, and each one issues its own specific guidance and rules of engagement. For simplicity, this paper will address only U.S. PRTs.

The military is rapidly improving and expanding its interagency (IA) coordination and PRTs are one of the best examples of this integration. Many PRTs consist of personnel from several different USG agencies, such as the DoD, DOS, and USAID. Because of this, CA officers must interact with subject matter experts and other personnel highly educated and experienced in economic development. For example, many of the State Department personnel who conduct reconstruction and stability operations have PhDs in economics or a related field. CA officers need to be versed and competent in both the language and the fields of those with whom they interact to garner credibility and to translate complex development philosophy into a language the local population can understand.

Another challenge CA personnel on PRTs encounter is trying to work closely with non-military organizations in the area. For example, many NGOs express an unwillingness to associate with the military because it may make them potential targets to enemies (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2003). This fear and the lack of trust can hamper the military's mission accomplishment. CA officers must be able to adapt and to assuage security concerns through independent actions and a commonsense assessment of the active threat environment.

In addition, the local population the military is attempting to help may associate uniforms with the prior regime's repression, or may find trusting personnel wearing the same uniform as those that targeted them or their families at an earlier time difficult (Mc Hugh & Gostelow, 2004). Thus CA officers must find a way to distinguish themselves from military combat personnel (such as uniform wear and actions) while still adhering to the rules of engagement.

#### **D. OPERATIONAL CIVIL AFFAIRS**

The operational level focuses on “immediate and near-term issues (for example, dislocated civilian [DC] operations, public safety programs, and so on), synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders, and integration of interagency operations with military operations” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-5).

At the operational level, CA officers serve as S-9s or G-9s on Division and Corps level staffs. CA functional specialists are most relevant at the operational and strategic levels, serving in a planning and advisory role to commanders and working within CMO cells (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 1-9).

#### **E. STRATEGIC CIVIL AFFAIRS**

This area is rarely addressed and is difficult to delineate. According to doctrine, at the strategic level, the goal is on “larger long-term global or regional issues such as economic development and stability” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-5).

The CA elements that conduct these types of operations are staff officers at the Corps level or at the geographic combatant command level, the Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) (USAR only). The CACOM’s mission “is to provide theater-level CA planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 2-2). CA officers at this echelon coordinate and support CA operations and efforts theater-wide through CAPTs, CLTs, CIM, and CMOCs (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 2-5).

#### **F. CONCLUSION**

Post 9/11, many military forces and branches found that the military leadership changed or augmented their operational roles. The CA branch is no exception. For example, during the most recent military deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army

already reorganized into modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The CA branch adapted and reorganized to support this new structure.

After the official end of hostilities, senior leaders looked to CA officers as the military's reconstruction experts. They expected CA officers to play a complex planning, coordinating, and advising role to the BCT leadership while simultaneously working with NGOs and local community organizations. In addition, they also expected CA officers to supervise and integrate the activities of the various tactical CA teams and PRTs operating in the BCT's area of operations.

While senior leaders had these expectations, most CA officers received training only in tactical civil affairs. Operational and strategic CA skills were not a part of the CAQC, and ILE only recently incorporated stability operations into its curriculum. The military's PME focuses on kinetic combat operations, and IW is a paradigm shift from this, where words and deeds can have an impact on par with a bomb or artillery shells.

Even with recent changes and updates, ILE and CAQC still lack a key educational component of stability and security operations: the logic behind the strategy; to earn the trust and support of the population through their "the hearts and minds."

## IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter identifies the tasks and skills CA officers need to operate successfully in the current and future security environment by comparing the demand for CA officer jobs and roles to the tasks and skills taught throughout the CA officer educational pipeline. After assessing whether shortfalls exists between the demand and the supply, Chapter V evaluates alternate means of educating CA officers throughout their careers.

This chapter will proceed by first evaluating the CA officer skills requirements as formally indicated in doctrine. Second, the chapter will suggest and describe additional skill requirements evidenced during the course of research that would enhance the utility and effectiveness of CA officers. Third, the chapter lists and describes CA officer educational shortfalls. The chapter closes with a discussion of several options to better educate and inculcate CA officers with these critical skills.

### A. CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER SKILL REQUIREMENTS

DA PAM 600-3 lists the specific skills and characteristics of a CA officer. Many of these skills acknowledge and differentiate the unique skills CA officers require to operate effectively.

The core competencies for CA officers are cross-cultural communications, regional expertise, language ability, interpersonal skills, personal lethality (Warrior Ethos), adaptive thinking and/or leadership, and technical proficiency. The CA officer is an expert in the command and employment of functional specialists, CA individuals, teams, and units in execution of these missions. CA officers are unique within CA forces because they provide special or unique civilian core competency skills...They must have the ability to solve complex political-military problems and develop and employ conventional and unconventional solutions. They also must be able to devise and execute non-standard and non-doctrinal methods and techniques when applicable to remedy unforeseen circumstances, and capable of decisive action for missions for which no doctrine exists. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007, p. 180)

## **1. Cross-Cultural Communications, Regional Expertise, Language Ability**

As the Civil-Military experts, commanders at all levels expect that CA officers have a particular background and expertise in an area of operations. These leaders expect that the CA officers can speak the language and relate to the local population, regardless of the team's experience level. This is not always the case; because of the high demand placed on the CA branch, many reserve or Individual Ready Reserve<sup>24</sup> (IRR) officers lack CA experience or background (J.K. Owens, personal communication, October 30, 2008; G. Woodson, personal communication, November 18, 2008).

Feedback from current PRT operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates this problem. One of the biggest concerns is “a deficiency of cultural awareness, regional knowledge, and local language skills” (Roe, 2005, p. 25). In such cases, adding an economist to a team will not help if that economist will not solicit input and understand the local environment. “Ignorance of tribal customs leads to misunderstanding and alienation. While insurgents communicate freely to gain intelligence, PRT members’ inability to speak tribal languages is a barrier to basic understanding and communication. Language difficulty prevents tactical units from establishing working relationships with village elders and receiving local intelligence” (Roe, 2005, p. 25).

Clear cultural understanding helped the Coalition successfully address the issue of militia groups in Iraq. The Coalition created the Sons of Iraq program, which successfully co-opted individuals economically who may otherwise be committing violence against Coalition forces in Iraq. The Sons of Iraq are a paid militia whose job is not to produce, but to reduce violence (Pincus, 2008). This program is successful for several reasons. First, it provides an economic incentive not to attack Coalition forces and provides men with an income to support their families. Second, the militia group maintains an important role in the local society, and the men retain their weapons, both of which preserve their authority and power status to the rest of the public, fulfilling their

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<sup>24</sup> Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) officers are officers who left the military before meeting their eight-year contractual obligation. In the event of a national need, the USG may recall IRR personnel to serve on active duty until their contract time expires.

emotional self-interest of needing respect and position. Third, the militia addresses an underlying historical narrative, in which local males and tribe members were empowered to protect their own families. In addition, having a job and earning an income positively enhance self-esteem and alleviate the need for criminal behavior to feed a family or to earn respect.

## **2. Leadership and Adaptive Thinking**

One of the most important skills of a military officer is leadership, especially in the area of SO: “dynamic, transformational leadership is central to any successful effort. It is the catalyst that drives broad success in any operation. Effective leadership inspires and influences others to work together toward a common goal; this is the essence of unity of effort” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008b, p. 1-18). Yet leadership requirements in the highly networked environments of stability operations require a greater boundary-spanning role for leaders (Williams, 2002).

The military typically operates according to rank, roles, and rules to divide work and labor. CA officers must be able to coordinate a variety of functions among diverse groups of people and organizations, many of whom may not be military. Some may be host nation assets, NGOs, or other local organizations or players with a stake in the country or region’s outcome.

Most active duty CA officers have a background in a conventional Army branch. These branches have a much different culture and approach to leadership than that required of CA officers. The conventional Army tends to operate in a strict vertical hierarchy of rank and function. Because this vertical decision making process is emphasized and rewarded, a military leader coming from this environment may lack the skills to operate outside the normal hierarchical environment to which he or she is accustomed. The flexible, cooperative nature needed to coordinate and manage relationships with other organizations sometimes operates unpredictably, and according to different rules. Networking between organizations “emphasizes fluid and flexible patterns of working based on communications networks....Expertise, not status, is the basis of personnel advancement and recognition” (Holohan, 2005, p. 140).

The flexibility needed for working cooperatively with other organizations may be difficult for military officers; because military operations require officers to distill order out of chaos, the military has developed an institutional culture that abhors disorder and uncertainty. Decision making is sequential, orderly, and based on fact and consistency of the outcome with preconceived precepts. (Holohan, 2005, p. 140)

This does not mean that military personnel are incapable of adapting to a volatile environment. In Iraq, General Petraeus recognized this adjustment from traditional military leadership roles: “One of the tests for a commander – at all levels – is to recognize the environment and to adjust and adapt constantly to it” (Lundberg, 2006, p. 37). If one approach he tried did not work, he tried another. If he encountered an obstacle, such as the Coalition’s closing all the borders and prohibiting trade, he worked to gain an exemption and to establish policies that the Coalition would accept (Lundberg, 2006).

### **3. Interpersonal Skills**

One of the key aspects of CA officers is working closely and coordinating with other organizations, both military and civilian. Interpersonal, leadership, and networking skills are an integral part of this capability.

Formality is an important cultural factor that can have a significant effect on interpersonal relations. Informality in relations is critical to developing trust and communication between different organizations working together. An organization with a leader who maintains an open door policy and knows everyone’s name develops a significant level of trust and contribution within the organization. In contrast, a leader who maintains a strict formality, keeps his door closed, and sees visitors by appointment only instead of leaving the safety of the base and meeting local people or aid workers produces an attitude that discourages participation and prevents the leader from developing personal relationships (Holohan, 2005).

Excessive formality can hamper the military’s effectiveness. With a rank-based, hierarchical structure, the military depends on the rank structure to maintain discipline and control. Officers in the conventional Army are indoctrinated into this type of environment, where “the value of people’s contribution [is] limited to their formal role”

(Holohan, 2005, p. 77). CA officers must overcome their indoctrination from the conventional military and adapt their thinking to working in a complex environment. CATs often operate in remote regions away from other conventional units and without significant assets or assistance. In this environment, every member of the team is critical to the mission's success. Some military leaders cannot conceptualize that a low-ranking private may have an idea to enhance an organization's operational effectiveness or mission accomplishment, but in CA, expertise is more important than status, and everyone has something to contribute, an attitude that is integral to creative and innovative problem solving. The free flow of information is critical to generating new and unique ideas and solutions.

#### **4. Ability to Solve Complex Political-Military Problems**

CA officers must constantly confront what Holohan calls “nonroutine complex problems” and must be prepared to address them (Holohan, 2005, p. 64). Problem-solving skills are important because many of the problems encountered during CA operations have no operational precedent, and a leader must be able to think on his or her feet and to make decisions with little guidance or instruction.

The types of problems encountered in CA operations are nonlinear in that they rarely have a doctrinal answer or solution. These types of problems are atypical of the conventional military expectation, which often focuses on “by-the-book” solutions or problem solving methods. Many of the challenges CA officers face fall into the category of “wicked problems,” a category of problems that are extremely difficult if not impossible to solve (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 9). Table 8 illustrates the differences among the types of operational problems. According to DA Pam 525-5-500, most conventional military training and planning addresses problems in the first two categories, “well-structured ‘puzzle,’” or “medium-structured ‘structurally complex problem’” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 9)<sup>25</sup>. The typical military officer does not doctrinally train for these types of problems.

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<sup>25</sup> For more information on complex problems, see Appendix A, an excerpt from DA Pam 525-5-500, which describes the category of complex problems as adapted to operational challenges.

An example of such a solution is how one CAT project fulfilled the village of El Agar's need for clean water. The team understood that the village could not afford generators to pump the water from the well and needed a self-sustaining, low-cost solution. This resulted in the solution of digging a well and taking advantage of the village's location in a natural wind-tunnel by integrating a windmill to pump the water (Meares, 2008, p. 12).

Military education already teaches problem-solving and decision-making skills, but could improve its capabilities in this area by integrating more original, scenario-based training into PME or a CA specific curriculum<sup>26</sup>.

	<b>Well-Structured “Puzzle”</b>	<b>Medium-Structured “Structurally Complex Problem”</b>	<b>Ill-Structured “Wicked Problem”</b>
<b>Problem Structuring</b>	The problem is self-evident. Structuring is trivial.	Professionals easily agree on its structure.	Professionals will have difficulty agreeing on problem structure and will have to agree on a shared starting hypothesis.
<b>Solution Development</b>	There is only one right solution. It may be difficult to find.	There may be more than one “right” answer. Professionals may disagree on the best solution. Desired end state can be agreed.	Professionals will disagree on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How the problem can be solved.</li> <li>• The most desirable end state.</li> <li>• Whether it can be attained.</li> </ul>
<b>Execution of Solution</b>	Success requires learning to perfect technique.	Success requires learning to perfect technique and adjust solution.	Success requires learning to perfect technique, adjust solution, and refine problem framing.
<b>Adaptive Iteration</b>	No adaptive iteration required.	Adaptive iteration is required to find the best solution.	Adaptive iteration is required both to refine problem structure and to find the best solution.

Table 8. Types of Problems and Solution Strategies (From Department of the Army, 2008, p. 9)

## 5. Collaborative Problem Solving

Collaborative problem solving is a problem-solving process integral to working with diverse groups of people. CA officers must approach problems through the cultural context to facilitate negotiation and problem-solving. “Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed” (Windle & Warren, 2008).

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<sup>26</sup> The NPS DA program offers a course in “Wicked Problems.” (*Naval Postgraduate School general catalog*, 2008)

There are several key principles of collaborative problem solving to consider. Identifying and then integrating the relevant stakeholders is important. Stakeholders are the people who have the power to make or block a decision, formally and informally, those who are impacted by a decision, and those who have expertise to facilitate the decision ("Book review: how to make collaboration work," 2007). A stakeholder analysis is key to organizing and directing efforts (Roberts & King, 1989, p. 70). Depending on the area or environment, many different groups could be actively competing for dominance. While the sheer number of stakeholders may seem overwhelming, they naturally fall into categories (Roberts & King, 1989, p. 68). For example, some groups will only be interested in black-market oil, others will want roads, others schools. These interest-categories will help assess which policies will affect and influence which stakeholders.

The goal of identifying stakeholders and their interests is to develop consensus. In the consensus phase, all the players in the decision making process must agree to the support the final decision. It is easier to break decisions into small parts instead of an "all or nothing" proposition, which can alienate key supporters ("Book review: how to make collaboration work," 2007).

The best way to effectively integrate the local population and generate buy-in is through direct local involvement. One technique is to establish committees at the local level, whether a city or township composed of the local stakeholders, government employees, and leaders. They are the ones that need to establish the exact priorities for projects and construction efforts. The local committee is also the one that will be responsible for managing the projects. The goal is to decentralize decisions to the local level and avoid the Coalition's dictating all decisions throughout the province.

## **B. ADDITIONAL SKILL SETS**

While DA PAM 600-3 lists the "official" skill list for CA officers, an effective CA officer must possess many other skills and knowledge sets. For example, one of the keys to effective state building is the development of social networks with the local population. The ability to develop and exert influence through these ties and relationships

can mean the difference between success and failure. CA officers must also have a solid grasp of project management, economic development, and IW techniques to provide the most effective, integrated support to whatever type of force they are supporting.

### **1. Developing a Network**

CA officers must be able to use their leadership and interpersonal skills to develop a network from scratch. The simplest means is to tie into existing networks. Existing networks of both individuals and organizations will simplify and facilitate the creation of a network organization. The officer must first be able to find and to identify the network. Many of these networks are covert and small. Once CA officers gain access to the network, often word of positive deeds will spread rapidly throughout the network, and support will increase<sup>27</sup> (McAdam, 2003).

Some of these networks will be leery of contact with foreigners and CA officers will need a delicate touch. CA officers can integrate extremist groups by working with leaders to focus on issues and actions instead of individual personalities. For example, while the extremist groups may not advocate a girls' school, they are more likely to support repairing a factory or power plant.

Part of the process of developing a network is identifying the leaders, or those individuals, who because of their formal leadership position, religious role, or other place in society, demonstrate influence over others' opinions and behavior. These personnel sometimes appear to have a disproportionate influence over others (Gladwell, 2000). "The relationship the team builds with the local tribal leaders can extend beyond the village as many of these leaders have influence even beyond the national boundaries," notes the leader of a CA team in Kut, Iraq (Meares, 2008).

CA officers and teams cannot and should not be responsible for every SO task that comes up. CA officers should support good governance, reconstruction, and economic development, but they should not rely on their knowledge alone. CA officers

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<sup>27</sup> This idea is based on social network theory, which explores the connections between individuals and the spread of ideas. People tend to be influenced more by those whose opinion they value compared to people with whom they do not routinely associate or interact (McAdam, 2003).

should be able to identify locals, IGO or NGO personnel, or a USG agent who is the subject matter expert in a given area and integrate their expertise and knowledge.

Networks need not be limited to the local environment, either. External organizations can provide useful ideas and serve as sounding boards with Wikis and websites for suggestions. These networks, military and otherwise, utilize diverse expertise and support from around the world and bring it to the local level even in remote regions through the internet.

Developing social embeddedness, “the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust, which in turn facilitate effective communication of information and the assumption of collaborative problem-solving responsibility” are another means to encourage network development (Holohan, 2005, p.81). A leader has many options to encourage dialogue. These include both planned and unplanned events such as celebratory events, dinners, or informal social gatherings, meals, and parties. These types of events provide opportunity for informal communication and encourage people to get to know one another and to develop friendships transcending organizations and cultures. For example, one military peacekeeper working in Croatia noted that “with each step forward, we would organize a party and an official ceremony to show our appreciation for the commitment and goodwill of the people involved and to urge them to keep on cooperating” (Schoups, 2001, p. 393).

## **2. Developing Trust in a Complex Environment**

Trust is integral in uncertain environments: “Trusting becomes the crucial strategy for dealing with an uncertain and uncontrollable future” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). Trust is about one person’s expectations for another’s behaviors: “Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). Predictability in actions simplifies complex environments by eliminating or reducing the unknown variables. Developing trust is integral in the current and future threat environment for multiple reasons. Trust facilitates cooperation, support, and the development of social capital, which is vital to working with different stakeholders with various interests.

Colonel Baker, a former brigade commander in Baghdad, Iraq, experienced the challenges and benefits of earning the trust and confidence of the Iraqis. He realized that positive and accurate information was not getting to the local Iraqis because of the slanted coverage of both the Arab media and international news stations. He focused on disseminating accurate information and communicating with the local press and Iraqi citizens to enhance Coalition credibility.

Col. Baker realized that most Iraqis would not be in contact with any media source or the Coalition, so local leaders and imams could influence Iraqi citizens and help generate Coalition support. He integrated local leaders into the decision-making process through weekly roundtables to address the concerns of leaders. This forum for discussion and the fact that local citizens could influence Coalition actions added to the Iraqis' trust and confidence (Baker, 2006). This integration also made the Coalition accountable to the population, which was "important for the creation and maintenance of trust, exchange of information, and collaborative problem solving" (Holohan, 2005, p. 85). Integrating the local population into the decision-making process at every step produces transparency and accountability in operations, which leads to trust in the organization, its motives, and its operations. Col. Baker's efforts increased the number of positive stories published about the coalition and increased cooperation between his force and the local Iraqis through tips, information, and joint projects (Baker, 2006, pp. 30-31).

In another example, a CA team leader operating in Kut, Iraq, noted that a CA team's interactions with the local population have significant effects outside of that area. "As the team gains the village's trust and respect, they become more effective in accomplishing their missions and helping the Government of Iraq accomplish its goals" (Meares, 2008).

CA officers have an integral role in this type of operational environment. CA officers must develop and foster trust with the people with whom they work, including the local population, IGOs, and NGOs. Many of the same expectations of honesty, integrity, and consistency apply to all stakeholders. In addition, CA actions and projects themselves are key to exerting U.S. goals in an SO environment.

### 3. Influence

Working within networks and interacting with different agencies, both foreign and domestic, requires the ability to exert influence<sup>28</sup>, or convince people to do what the U.S. wants them to do. This includes persuading local sheiks to support Coalition efforts, or a local religious leader to ameliorate hate speeches against the U.S. CA officers must understand how, when, and where to exert influence to affect the desired goal.

One method of generating influence within a network is being as central as possible and facilitating communication and networking between individuals and organizations. Centrality in a network leads to power<sup>29</sup>. Those with links to more people and involved in more networks can control information flow and content. The more networks to which one is connected, especially as the person bridging multiple networks, the increased likelihood of receiving information faster than others further removed or with fewer links in the network. Knowledge and information are power, and CA officers can use their connection to local and foreign agencies to influence the other organizations and people within the network (Pfeffer, 1994).

Military scholars frequently cite Cialdini influence techniques when referencing SOF operations. These techniques describe several methods that SOF can use to develop influential relationships during their operations (Coughran, 2007). Table 9 lists some techniques based on “deep-seated characteristics of human nature that lend themselves to influence” (Coughran, 2007, p. 15).

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<sup>28</sup> “The term influence refers to a type of response whereby one person or a group of people will acquiesce to the requests of another” (Coughran, 2007, p. 15).

<sup>29</sup> Network centrality can have different meanings. In one sense, centrality means how many connections or links a node has. Centrality also refers to physical location (Pfeffer, 1994).

Technique	Description
Reciprocation	Tit-for-tat
Obedience to authority	Authority often leads to automatic compliance
Commitment, consistency	Behave in accordance with our previous decisions
Likeability	Similarity, common ground
Scarcity	You always want what you can't have
Planning	Know who you are trying to influence

Table 9. Cialdini's Influence Techniques (After Coughran, 2007, pp. 15-18)

These techniques serve as a guide to techniques by which military personnel can indirectly influence and convince local leaders and the population to support or help them. This can be as simple as earning the trust of the local sheik, or convincing a local militia to work for the military instead of supporting the insurgents.

#### 4. Counterinsurgency and Guerilla Warfare

While CA operates in many different types of environments, CA's mission is always oriented on the civilian population. As discussed in Chapter II, the present and future wars must focus on the local population and earning their support. This philosophy is not well-integrated into either the military's PME system or the CA officer educational pipeline. However, the "hearts and minds" philosophy is integral to developing operational plans and concepts. As one CA officer noted

Current doctrine is antiquated for low intensity, counter insurgency operations. Most Civil Affairs units focus on quick, easy, and feel good strategies instead of long term, exit strategies designed to leverage the maneuver commander's intent. Civil Military doctrine training at TRADOC schools must be revitalized to include books like The Small Wars Manual and similar low intensity, win the hearts and minds types of materials. Additionally, developing soldiers to understand the complexity and interrelationships of governmental, economic, military, and informational functions is a must. (Orbock, 2005, p. 15).

The issue pertains to both conventional branches and to CA. Combat leaders need to be educated in these concepts to integrate CA into all plans and operations. CA officers need to understand how to plan and direct actions to achieve a specific impact. The goal in an integrated approach is to earn the respect of the civilian population. Merely

conducting projects and hoping that they help the overall war effort is inefficient, ineffective, and may ultimately cause more harm than good.

One of the best frameworks to illustrate this concept is termed the “Mystic Diamond,” shown in Appendix F. This very simple model illustrates the interrelationship of the various elements present in environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan and serves as a firm basis by which to assess implications of U.S. actions. Understanding this framework would be useful for all CA operating levels, tactical, operational, and strategic.

## **5.      Economics of Insurgencies**

McCormick’s Mystic Diamond model ties into behavioral economics. Behavioral economics, or a historical narrative, helps to explain people’s actions. CA personnel need to understand how people perceive the world and how it ties into their actions. Most people believe that others make logical or rational decisions; that people think logically, analyze their problems, and make decisions based on a cost-benefit model. This implies that the person has a clear understanding and relatively complete knowledge of the problem. To make a decision, a person uses the cost-benefit model to assess whether an action will benefit more than hurt a person. This cost-benefit analysis model assesses economic gain and reputational benefits as the possible positive outcomes against the potential negative outcomes of arrest, wounding, or death.

For example, in terms of conflict, a member of the population may determine that the potential cost of planting an improvised explosive device (IED) (potential arrest, possible death) may outweigh positive benefits (monetary gain to feed his family, enhanced reputation), or vice versa. If the benefits outweigh the costs to the individual, he will plant the IED, otherwise he will not.

Some of the costs and benefits are culture specific (reputational, for example) and an individual in one situation may weigh the costs and benefits differently than another in the same circumstances because of his or her historical narrative. For an American soldier, staying alive and returning to his family may a priority, while a foreign military

fighter from Syria may place dying for the Muslim cause first. The American and Syrian may view the choices of the other as irrational based on their respective narratives.

Economics also ties into the causes and ways to prevent conflict. Economics is more than supply and demand.




Figure 10. A Simple Economic Model (McNab, 2008)

The model in Figure 10 is based upon the basic principles of supply and demand. The model begins with scarcity of a given commodity or service. Scarcity means demand exceeds availability. Demand leads to higher prices, which differentiates who can possess the item and who cannot. Because the item is scarce and more people want it than can afford it, the demand can produce social effects or change based on social effects. A social effect might be infant or elderly mortality or immigration rates to a region. For example, if clean drinking water as a resource is scarce, this may affect infant mortality, and increased population migration to a city may increase scarcity by increasing demand.

Scarcity and social factors can combine and produce other social effects. For example, in the clean water example, an individual may decide that his child needs clean water more than another family without small children, and approach the head of the household and try to purchase or steal his water. If this fails, he may try to intimidate or scare the other head of household into giving him his water. The individual may ultimately decide that violence is his last option, that the risks outweigh the benefits, and assault the head of the other household and take his water. In this way, scarcity and social factors can interact and ultimately escalate to violence.

The last factor in the model is consequences. The previous three issues, scarcity, social effects, and conflict, result in consequences. Consequences of the water scarcity example could be death, and violence as an accepted means to effect water transactions, and desensitization to violence throughout the society. A society and individuals' historical narrative and framework will interact with the environment to shape the interaction of scarcity, social effects, and conflict.

Understanding these models is important for a CA officer operating in a conflict or pre-conflict environment because it provides a framework to understand the decisions that people make. The CA officer can use the framework to assess projects and actions and determine whether a project will garner popular support.

## **6. Financial Management and Project Management**

“CA units should come with the skills and information management equipment to facilitate better-managed effects with money,” from an AAR, 425th Civil Affairs Battalion with 1 AD 21 December 2004 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006b, p. 3-13). A common AAR comment from CA officers is a lack of experience or understanding of the different pools of money associated with IW and SO. Understanding which funding sources they can use for which types of projects and how to apply for the funds would eliminate a significant source of confusion.

Project management is another area in which CA officers receive little training. While some projects may be small in scope or scale, others are complex, long-term, and involve many different vendors, companies, and smaller projects. Project management would help CA officers simultaneously facilitate, manage, and balance many long-term projects efficiently and effectively.

## **C. SHORTFALLS**

This thesis assesses the shortfalls in the education supply by comparing the demand derived in Chapter II to the educational supply in Chapter III. Table 10 lists the results of a comparison between CA skill requirements and those that CA officers learn throughout their careers.

In the current and future threat environment, the skills in Table 3 are integral to success. As the CA mission requirements increase around the world, leaders will expect CA officers to be able to take the helm, plan, and conduct integrated SO or reconstruction missions that will contribute to the U.S.’ long-term goals. However, CA officers must first learn these skills before they can successfully implement and practice them.

<b>Shortfalls</b>
Assess and implement plans to support environmental security
Assess and implement plans to support global health concerns and issues
Operate in complex environments
Conduct and coordinate stability operations
Plan for long-term economic development
Conduct and coordinate prevention operations
Form hasty networks

Table 10. CA Skill and Task Educational Shortfalls

Just as in any career field, CA officers do not necessarily utilize all critical skills at all times. Tactical CA requires a different skill set from operational and strategic. Promotion to field grade leads to a CA officer performing more operational and strategic level jobs as opposed to tactical. Ideally, CA officers would receive a second knowledge infusion at the field grade level, after having time to absorb and experience the tactical CA mission first hand.

Typically, students do not fully internalize knowledge and skills are until they practically use them in real world applications. Attempting to teach students to perform tasks in situations in which they have little or no experience is not usually effective. While practical exercises can alleviate part of this problem, the real world may be completely different.

## D. EDUCATIONAL OPTIONS

### 1. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

While NPS already has a SOCCOM-sponsored Master's program in place, this program is not always readily accessible or convenient to Reserve CA officers. Between deployments, training time, and full-time jobs, Reserve CA officers often lack the time to divert or dedicate to full time schooling and education.



**International Public Policy Graduate Program**  
Stability, Security, and Development – DRAFT

Focus\Qtr	Qtr 1	Qtr 2	Qtr 3	Qtr 4	Qtr 5	Qtr 6
Global Context	CL3100 (PROS) Global Change and International Governance	(New) Regional and International Governance (UCLA)	(New) Global Environment and Development (UCLA)	(New/PROS) Global Health Issues	Thesis block	Elective
Society and Security	CL3100 (PROS) Security and Development in Complex Operations	NS3042 Economics of Emergencies for Security Building	(INET PROS) Innovation Strategy (Marc Ventresca)	SD4126 Trust, Influence and Networks	Elective	<i>NEW</i> Economic Growth Systems in Developing Countries (Bob McNab)
Analytic Tools	CL3300 (PROS) Introduction to Analytic Methods	Modeling SSTR (Kurt Saxe)	MN3116 Strategies for Building Consensus	(INET PROS) Inter-organizational Design Collaboration (Susan Howser)	SD4321 Wicked Problems	Thesis block
Leader Development	Colloquium	Colloquium	Colloquium	Colloquium	Colloquium	Colloquium




Core courses  
Baseline Certificate course in Stability and Security Operations  
**BOLD** – GBBPP courses (existing and new)

Summary total: 24  
GBBPP: 13  
Electives: 2  
Thesis / project: 2  
Interdisciplinary: 7

Figure 11. International Public Policy Graduate Program in Stability, Security, and Development (From Guttieri, 2008a, p. 11)

NPS, working with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, developed a pilot certificate program to assist Reserve CA officers in earning a Master's degree and garnering the critical skills and knowledge to fulfill their responsibilities, primarily at the field grade level. Figure 11 shows the courses and outline of the Master's degree program in Stability, Security, and Development. NPS designed the program so that Reserve students can complete the program in a mostly distributed format with only

four weeks in-residence. This will minimize impact on the officers of missing work for a prolonged period outside deployments while still facilitating a rewarding educational experience.




Figure 12. Military Occupational Specialty 38A United States Army Reserve Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course (Woodson, 2008a, pp. 8-9)

USACAPOC and NPS also developed a course to qualify new CA majors (38A). The course will involve DE followed by a four-week, portable resident program (Woodson, 2008a). Figure 12 illustrates the draft course curriculum. Such a course would alleviate the current knowledge shortfalls that new field grade officers experience on the transition from tactical to operational and strategic CA operations.

## 2. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

The JSOU offers many programs that support CA and stability operations. One of their most popular programs is the Joint Civil-Military Operations Campaign Planning Workshop. The course “is specifically intended to prepare CA personnel to be more proficient in the Joint planning process” (G.E. Doan, personal communication, October 9, 2008). Appendix E lists the course syllabus, which includes key tasks such as interagency planning, CA assessment, COA development, and fiscal management, among other relevant modules.

Students consistently award the course positive feedback on its relevance and utility (Joint Civil-Military Operations, 2008; D. E. Doan, personal communication, October 9, 2008). Many CA officers who attended the course noted that they benefited greatly from the experience, which covered many areas not covered extensively in the CAQC ("Student comments - JCMOCPW 08C," 2008; R. Lewis, personal communication, October 9, 2008).

The JSOU course would be a tremendous asset to field grade CA officers expected to enter operational and strategic CA level jobs. Experienced personnel teach the course, which includes hands-on practical exercises to reinforce the material. The JSOU course also has the advantage of being both short and portable. JSOU instructors teach the five day course three times a year at CA units around the world (G.E. Doan, personal communication, November 24, 2008).

### **3. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM)**

DISAM "provides professional education, research, and support to advance U.S. foreign policy through security assistance and cooperation" ("About DISAM," 2008). A DoD-run institution, DISAM provides multiple courses and programs useful for CA officers. Their curricula include on-site and distance education courses for those conducting stability operations, including inter-agency cooperation, leadership skills, cultural awareness, and public diplomacy (Toomey, 2008, pp. 1 & 4).

DISAM also manages a 12-month graduate-level studies program called GMAP II in conjunction with Tufts University in Massachusetts, the result of which is an international affairs focused Global Master of Arts from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Toomey, 2008, p. 4).

### **4. Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy**

Tufts offers the GMAP program, a one-year international studies program designed for mid to senior professionals working in business, politics, or other international oriented fields ("GMAP Homepage," 2008). Courses include leadership,

foreign policy, international trade and investment, and international politics among other pertinent topics ("GMAP Courses," 2008). The program combines distance education with period resident sessions.

### **5. Norwich University's Master of Arts in Diplomacy**

Norwich University's Master of Arts in Diplomacy is another program designed for established professionals seeking to expand their knowledge of the international arena. The program can take 18 to 24 months depending on the option of a thesis track and offers three different concentrations ("Masters of Arts in Diplomacy," 2008). Two of these concentrations, international terrorism and international conflict management, are particularly relevant to CA officers. The international terrorism concentration focuses on both state sponsored and non-state sponsored terrorism, while the international conflict management concentration focuses on avoidance, management, and mitigation of conflict for those who practice diplomacy and post-conflict nation building ("Masters of Arts in Diplomacy," 2008).

### **6. University of Montana**

The University of Montana is currently developing an interdisciplinary program. The five-year, distance education program "would combine courses focusing on leadership and analysis, international relations, micro-development economics, social and cultural anthropology, national security, cross-cultural communications, the interagency process, terrorism, negotiations, and regional courses" oriented towards a professional audience including military officers, diplomatic, and NGO personnel (Howard, 2008, pp. 42-43).

### **7. James Madison University**

James Madison University's school of School of Public and International Affairs is developing a program that supports CA functions. "The proposed curriculum for the graduate course includes research methods, ethics and leadership, public management issues, international relations, public information and communication, communication in

conflict situations (including mediation and conflict resolution and cross-cultural communication), and strategic planning” (Howard, 2008). The program will conclude with a “Capstone event” to integrate students’ knowledge “to develop a country report, campaign plan, and business plan” (Howard, 2008).

## **E. CONCLUSION**

The current and future threat requires the military to perform new and different roles. The augmented responsibilities reflected in branches such as CA dictate that the branch and the personnel within it must evolve to remain relevant. Some of the key skills that CA officers need and are not learning in sufficient detail are the ability to create networks, cultivate trust within those networks, and exert positive influence to support U.S. goals. Educating CA officers in the skills and knowledge appropriate for the new environment is a critical part of that evolution that can only enhance CA's capabilities and the U.S.' goal and mission accomplishment throughout the world.

A variety of programs and options exist that educate students in international politics and policy, terrorism, negotiation, and communication. The most important characteristic of any program is the analytical rigor involved. The military must develop CA officers through critical thinking and program solving skills. Much of the historical background and information are relevant and useful; no step-by-step guide exists to instruct a CA officer on how to perform his or her job. This is especially true once an officer starts working at the operational and strategic levels. Guidelines, policy, and doctrine exist, but a CA officer must be able to work cooperatively with multiple elements to produce unique solutions to complex problems.

An officer cannot merely attend one program or institution that produces such officers. Rather, officer education is a developmental process that continues as an officer rises in rank and responsibility. The military's PME must develop such leaders who can evolve into adaptable CA officers. The CA officer education pipeline also must inculcate these skills while providing CA officers the knowledge they need to integrate themselves seamlessly into both conventional and special operations.

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## **V. CONCLUSION**

In recent years, the military's CA capabilities received a significant amount of attention. A House report published in May 2008 noted that DoDD 3000.05 indicates a greater need for CA-type capability and directed a study into CA force size and structure, propensity, and education (House Committee On Armed Services, 2008, pp. 421-422).

The assessment of the CA educational pipeline indicates that the CAQC successfully introduces new CA officers to the career field and teaches them the rudimentary skills that they need to perform at the tactical level. The course, however, lacks an effective tie-in to higher level staff operations at the operational and strategic level. The course would also benefit from an introduction to influence operations in which CA officers design civil actions and projects to gain the population's support.

The clear result is that most company grade officers operate at the tactical level, while field grade officers operate at the tactical and strategic levels. Field grade officers need to have additional education incorporated into their professional development pipeline. Ideally, this would be coordinated with ILE to minimize an officer's time away from the formal military.

Another key factor is ensuring that the general purpose forces and SOF understand how to use and integrate CA forces into their plans and operations. While CA officers must be proficient within their career fields, if the leaders they support lack an understanding of how CA can support their plans, they are unlikely to utilize CA forces effectively. A staff that understands how and when to utilize CA in its planning and operations will be more likely to incorporate them.

### **A. CHALLENGES**

The military can try to improve CA officer knowledge and capability through institutional knowledge and understanding. For example, the military could revise the CAQC education and curriculum, but creating an effective curriculum and integrating it into the leadership development pipeline will necessarily take time. In addition, when

new skills are introduced into an organization, other skills must atrophy or decrease in importance; training time, schooling, and operational requirements impose limits to developing and sustaining proficiency.

Another consideration is the link between knowledge, experience, and learning. To indoctrinate a CA officer with knowledge effectively, the officer must practically utilize it. That is one of the key reasons that educators follow classroom education with practical exercises. Practical or training exercises reinforce knowledge and place it into perspective. Understanding that only so much knowledge can be productively transferred at one time is integral to developing effective training curricula.

## **B. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY**

### **1. The Right People for the Right Job?**

The CA branch will never be able to inculcate the correct skills to its officer corps if it does not have the right people in the branch. With the recent legislated increase in CA forces, the branch accessions personnel accepted more candidates than ever before. As with any recruiting increase, quickly increasing the number of personnel accepted raises the question of whether all of those accepted are sufficiently qualified, or if the accessions personnel lowered standards to be able to accept additional personnel.

Active Duty officers assessed into CA must meet minimum language aptitude requirements and provide a resume as well as other data. A board of senior special operations officers<sup>30</sup> screens candidates annually (M. R. Foreman, personal communication, November 6, 2008). Reserve officers place a branch transfer request through the reserve accessions section and their current branch (K. Brown, personal communication, October 9, 2008). While civilian education and language aptitude and capability are highly valued, as long as an officer's current branch releases him or her and he or she meets the basic criteria for CA, CA accepts his or her branch transfer request (K. Brown, personal communication, October 9, 2008).

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<sup>30</sup> Senior officers include those in the ranks of O5 and above from the Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations branches.

The assessment and board process for both Active duty and Reserve personnel should be consistent and adhere to the skills needed for a CA officer. The skills for Functional Specialists may differ from those of Generalists. Regardless, consistent standards are integral to maintaining the credibility and consistency of the branch.

An important factor in developing the leadership skills required to perform effectively as a CA officer is the type of person recruited and who remain in the career field. Some people lack the interpersonal or social skills to facilitate relationship building. If not, can the military teach them these skills? The military is a hierachal organization, and the personnel who rise to the most powerful and influential positions within it are likely to be those who excel at managing and leading hierarchies. Some people's personalities and experiences may be more predisposed to excel in certain types of environments.

## **2. The Right Agency for the Right Job?**

### ***a. State Department versus CA?***

Another important question is if CA's Functional Specialists are the right officers to be performing the SO jobs that the USG is currently expecting them to do. The DOS is more doctrinally suited to those types of tasks, especially with the experience and specialization of its USAID personnel. USAID personnel are responsible for the U.S.' foreign assistance program ("This is USAID," 2008). USAID personnel manage funds and programs to support economic development and democracy around the world ("This is USAID," 2008). Many of their responsibilities overlap with those of CA officers.

### ***b. Functional Specialists versus the Civilian Response Corps?***

A key issue is CA's functional specialists. CA functional specialists are only in the USAR. When the military first created CA forces after WWII, the majority of CA forces were in the Reserves because of their functional specialties. The branch assigned the CA officers their specialties based on their civilian job skills and specialties. The more time passes since WWII, the less the Reserve CA meets this standard. Reserve

officers often become CA officers because of location in the U.S. instead of a useful civilian job skill (J.K. Owens, personal communication, September 30, 2008; F. Smith, personal communication, October 6, 2008; G. Woodson, personal communication, November 18, 2008). SWC or the CA proponent lack any programs designed to inculcate CA officers with the skills and knowledge required of functional specialists (except medical and legal).

The DOS' new Civilian Response Corps could easily replace CA functional specialists. They have a similar role as CA functional specialists, serving as subject matter experts in such areas as economics, governance, public affairs, and education. Just as CA functional specialists deploy to an area after the CA generalists conduct their assessments and other forces establish a minimal level of security, the CRC deploys to a relatively secure area to perform stability operations.

Eliminating functional specialists would also eliminate a management problem for those responsible for managing CA officers. As mentioned previously, the military lacks specialized training programs to develop, sustain, or enhance many of the functional specialist skills.

## **C. CSIS INVESTIGATION QUESTIONS**

Studying the Civil Affairs officer educational pipeline facilitates also answers many of the questions posed to the CSIS study.

### **1. What are DoD Civil Affairs forces required to do in accordance with USG and DoD policies from the tactical to strategic levels of war?**

At the tactical level, CA officers primarily perform on Tactical Civil Affairs Teams conducting and managing local projects. This is true of both Generalists and Functional Specialists. At this level, CA officers are part of the military's front line of influence operations. The projects selected and how they are planned and implemented can have a critical impact on the face of the conflict. Integrating local opinion and utilizing local labor will enhance the population's support and credibility of the intervention.

At the operational levels, CA officers operate on staffs and coordinate civil-military operations on a regional basis. These officers must understand how to integrate CA into a commander's plans and operations, and provide guidance to subordinate and supported CA units to further support the commander's political and military goals.

**2. What are the gaps between USG/DoD policies for stability and reconstruction operations, and DoD Civil Affairs policy, doctrine and structure?**

As stated in USG policy, the DOS has the lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations. If this is the case, then the DOS must have supporting funding and a means to influence and integrate their operations with that of the DoD. The Consortium for Complex Operations is merely one example that demonstrates the difficulty of assigning tasks without providing the requisite support or authorities. The USG must clearly define and separate the responsibilities of the DOS and the DoD and align form, function, and funding to follow.

The DoD lacks a central proponent that can effectively establish control of all of the services' CA forces and enforce the USG's expectations of its CA forces. An especially important issue is that of Reserve CA versus Active duty. The two services with most of the CA forces, the Army and the Marine Corps, both hold the majority of their CA forces in the Reserves. If the USG expects the CA mission to change from periodic activations to an ongoing, continuous mission, then the USG needs to shift the bulk of its forces to the Active duty side. This would maintain an active pool of trained and experienced CA officers who can perform any required CA mission at a moment's notice.

Another propensity factor that can easily be resolved is a common schoolhouse. While each military branch has some unique requirements and functions of its CA officers, all CA officers would benefit from a common core. As discussed earlier, in the conflict in Iraq, the Marine CAGs served much the same supporting function to Army units as the CATs. A common schoolhouse would provide economy of effort and scale to educate CA officers. Each service could incorporate service unique requirements into the common schoolhouse or teach them at a later time in a service-specific institution. This

would also alleviate the need for external agencies such as the State Department or NGOs to interface with multiple schools to affect the CA corps.

**3. What structure adjustments are required to ensure sufficient and efficient utilization of DoD Civil Affairs capabilities to support both MCO and IW missions?**

This question ties into the previous two questions. Without a clear understanding of the role and expectations that the USG expects of CA, DoD cannot effectively recommend or plan structural adjustment or changes. One discussion must take place before the other.

Another important factor to this is the distribution of Functional Specialists versus Generalists. Functional Specialists' expertise is required at the nation-building level, but to reach that stage, the military must first establish security. If the military can establish an effective level of security, then other government agencies such as the State Department and its Civilian Response Corps could also enter the area.

Another issue is recruiting Functional Specialists. Should the military recruit all Functional Specialists from the civilian sector, or should it grow and develop its own cadre? There are positive and negative aspects to each option. For example, the military placed the Functional Specialists into the Reserves so that the personnel could continue to perform their jobs between deployments. Continuous military operations and requirements would alleviate the problem of employment between military operations. If the military were to develop its own core of Functional Specialists, then the military would need to incorporate additional training and schooling to produce the expertise and overcome an initial lack of experience. Would these officers perform better if they performed first as Generalist and then progressed to Functional Specialists as field grade officers? In the short term, such a strategy would produce an intermediate shortfall of trained personnel as the military trained and recruited a set of Functional Specialists and went through the growing pains of initial training, education, doctrine, and policy. Such a new career path may necessarily differ from those field grade officers who remain generalists, which may impact future promotions and leadership positions.

Many military leaders expect CA Generalists to have a significant level of general expertise in many of the areas in which Functional Specialists focus. The Generalists perform a variety of mission sets across the spectrum of operations in both permissive and nonpermissive environment. Generalists need to be able to find and select local expertise which can self develop an area or generate the knowledge set - one of the most important lessons is that local problems are most effectively solved with local solutions.

**4. What changes should be made to DoD Directive 2000.13 “Civil Affairs” to ensure DoD Civil Affairs capabilities can support a whole-of-government approach for stabilization and reconstruction operations?**

DoDD 2000.13 needs to specify a primary proponent for DoD’s CA forces. DoDD 2000.13 references Army CA forces solely under USASOC. To expand DoD CA capabilities, CA forces should be removed from the header of Special Forces and placed as a separate branch with the Army’s other military branches. There are some economies of scale and effort such as cultural awareness and language that suggest aligning CA forces with SOF would be easier for the DoD, but CA forces, especially the Reserves, primarily provide support to conventional forces. In addition, the functional and mission distinction between Active and Reserve CA forces is unnecessary; both should have the same skill set. An outsider interacting with either a Reserve or an Active CA officer should find the distinction transparent.

**5. What is the appropriate mix of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) Civil Affairs capabilities to support the range of military operations?**

The most important factor in answering this question is the mission that the USG expects CA officers to perform. The CA mission requirements to support conventional (GPF) and SOF missions differ slightly in their intent and execution. While the military is shifting its focus considerably towards missions previously solely the realm of SOF, many SOF-specific missions such as embassy support or support to Joint Task Forces are still SOF specific. These questions of mission, structure, and support are interrelated.

## **D. CONCLUSION**

The military can try to improve CA officer knowledge and capability through institutional knowledge and understanding. For example, the military could revise the CAQC education and curriculum, but creating an effective curriculum and integrating it into the leadership development pipeline will take time. In addition, when new skills are introduced into an organization, other skills must atrophy or decrease in importance; training time, schooling, and operational requirements impose limits to developing and sustaining proficiency.

The military struggles to maintain its relevancy and to sustain its proficiency regardless of the branch. The CA branch is no different. The current and future threat environment calls for more of the CA roles and responsibilities to prevent conflict and instability around the world. These types of operations, while not unique in the U.S.' history, adapt according to the world's context. Those operating in this environment must be able to understand and to adapt rapidly to the environment and context.

## APPENDIX A: ELEVEN CHARACTERISTICS OF ILL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS (FROM DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 2008, PP. 10-11)

(1) There is no definitive way to formulate an ill-structured problem. Given a tame problem, it is possible to formulate the problem with all the information necessary to solve it—provided that the problem-solver knows his method. However, this is not possible with wicked problems. The information needed to understand the problem depends upon how one defines it. And the solution depends upon how one understands the problem, or how one answers the question: “What is causing this problem?” Ill-structured problems rarely have a single cause, and different stakeholders will see the relationships between the causes and their importance differently. Thus, understanding and formulation depend to some degree upon the perspective of the problem-solver rather than objective truth. This is not to say that the objective conditions do not exist, but our perception of these conditions as a problem that must be solved is itself subjective. Thus an ill-structured problem cannot be known, but must instead be constructed. As John Schmitt notes, “Understanding a wicked problem is not a matter of capturing reality sufficiently correctly, but of constructing an interpretation that is sufficiently useful in dealing with the reality.”

(2) We cannot understand an ill-structured problem without proposing a solution. Understanding the problem and conceiving a solution are identical and simultaneous cognitive processes. For example, if we formulate an insurgency as the result of a failed regional economy, our solution will be different than if we formulated the insurgency as the result of poor governance. The formulation of the problem points in the direction of a particular solution. This insight will be discussed at greater length in the section below on operational art (see paragraph 1-4).

(3) Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique and novel. Historical analogies may provide useful insights—particularly on individual aspects of a larger problem—but the differences between even similar situations are profound and

significant. The political goals at stake, stakeholders involved, cultural milieu, histories, and other dynamics will all be novel and unique to a particular situation.

(4) Ill-structured problems have no fixed set of potential solutions. Since each wicked problem is a one-of-a-kind situation, it requires a custom solution rather than a standard solution modified to fit circumstances. Tactical doctrine offers standard templates for action, standard ways of doing things that have to be adapted to specific circumstances. Strategists and operational artists have no similar kit of generic solutions. The dynamics that make an operational problem unique also demand the design of a custom solution. Additionally, there is no way to prove that “all solutions to a wicked problem have been identified and considered.” Commanders may never consider some solutions, either because they are too exotic or because self-imposed constraints limit potential actions.

(5) Solutions to ill-structured problems are better-or-worse, not right-or-wrong. There is no objective measure of success and different stakeholders may disagree about the quality of a solution. The suitability of a solution will depend upon how the individual stakeholders have formulated the problem and what constitutes success for them.

(6) Ill-structured problems are interactively complex. Operational problems are socially complex because people have tremendous freedom of interaction. Since interactively complex problems are non-linear, a relatively minor action can create disproportionately large effects. The same action performed on the same problem at a later time may produce a different result. Interactive complexity makes it difficult to explain and predict cause and effect.

(7) Every solution to an ill-structured problem is a ‘one-shot operation.’ Every attempted course of action has effects that create a new situation and cannot be undone. The consequences of military action are effectively irreversible. Whenever actions are irreversible and the duration of their effects is long, every attempted action counts.

(8) There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to an ill-structured problem. The perceived quality of a solution to an ill-structured problem can change over time. Speaking metaphorically, yesterday’s solution might appear good today, but

disastrous tomorrow as the unintended effects become clearer. In the discussion of measures of effectiveness, JP 5-0 notes that measurable results to a particular action may not appear for some time. This time lag complicates assessment enormously, because in the meantime the operational command may have executed other actions, which will make assessing cause and effect even more difficult.

(9) Ill-structured problems have no ‘stopping rule’. It is impossible to say conclusively that such a problem has been solved in the sense that a student knows when he has solved a math problem. Work on a wicked problem will continue until strategic leaders judge the situation is “good enough,” or until national interest, will, or resources have been diverted or exhausted.

(10) Every ill-structured problem is a symptom of another problem. The causal explanation for a problem will determine the range of possible solutions. Yet, solving one problem often reveals another higher level problem of which the original one was a symptom. The level at which an operational problem is solved depends among other things upon the authority, confidence, and resources of a particular commander. One should not simply cure symptoms, but should rather strive to solve the problem at the highest possible level. However, if the problem is formulated at too high a level, the broader and more general it becomes and therefore the less likely it is to solve particular aspects of the specific problem.

(11) The problem-solver has no right to be wrong. The writ of an operational commander and his staff is to improve the state of affairs in the world as his countrymen perceive it. Like others in Government service, he is responsible for the consequences of the actions he generates.

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## APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

**civil affairs** — Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. See also **civil affairs activities; civilmilitary operations**. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 88)

**civil affairs activities** — Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civilmilitary operations. See also **civil affairs; civil-military operations**. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 88)

**civil-military operations**. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO**. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 88)

**conventional**. Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., of the regular armed forces of a country that are capable of conducting military operations using non-nuclear weapons, but excluding designated special operations forces. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-2)

**conventional forces** — 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 124)

**counterinsurgency** — Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called **COIN**. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 130)

**counterterrorism** — Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called **CT**. See also **antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism**. (JP 3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 132)

**foreign internal defense** — Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID**. (JP 3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 216)

**guerrilla** — A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. See also **unconventional warfare**. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 235)

**guerrilla warfare** — Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called **GW**. See also **unconventional warfare**. (JP 3-05.1) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, P. 235)

**indirect methods (or means).** The term “indirect approach” has three distinct meanings within the context of IW: 1. Unbalance and dislocate adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked. 2. Empower, enable, and leverage IA and multinational strategic partners to attack adversaries militarily or non-militarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by U.S. joint forces. 3. Take actions with or against other states or armed groups in order to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence

adversaries directly. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, P. b-3)

**insurgency.** 1. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 2. An organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. However, insurgencies' goals may be more limited. Insurgencies generally follow a revolutionary doctrine and use armed force as an instrument of policy. (FM 100-20, 1990) 3. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of an established government or societal structure, or the expulsion of a foreign military presence, through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (Proposed by U.S. Special Operations Command) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, P. B-3)

**insurgent** — Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership. See also **antiterrorism; counterinsurgency; insurgency.** (JP 3-07.2) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 269)

**irregular.** Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country. See also **conventional, nonconventional.** (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, pp. B-3 to B-4)

**irregular forces.** Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 283)

**irregular warfare.** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other

capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called **IW**. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-4)

**irregular warfare campaign.** A campaign that primarily focuses on irregular warfare operations or activities. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-4)

**low-intensity conflict.** Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are localized generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called **LIC**. (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-4)

**military support to security, stability, transition, and reconstruction.** Department of Defense activities that support U.S. government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. (DODD 3000.05)

**national defense strategy** — A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. Also called **NDS**. (JP 3-0) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 368)

**National Military Strategy** — A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called **NMS**. See also **National Security Strategy; strategy; theater strategy**. (JP 3-0) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 370)

**national policy** — A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 370)

**national security** — A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. See also **security**. (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 370)

**National Security Strategy** — A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called **NSS**. See also **National Military Strategy; strategy; theater strategy**. (JP 3-0) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 371)

**nation assistance** — Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, U.S. Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 3-0) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, pp. 371-372)

**non-state actor.** A group or organization that is not within the formal structure of any state, not limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of any state and without loyalty to any state. Examples include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, political parties, labor unions, commercial trade associations, criminal enterprises, and armed groups such as insurgent and terrorist organizations, informal armed militias, and private military companies. See also **armed group, nongovernmental organization**. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-5)

**psychological operations** — Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. See also **overt peacetime psychological operations programs; perception management**. (JP 3-53) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 441)

**reconstruction operations.** Operations to establish or rebuild the critical political, social, and economic systems or infrastructure necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance in an operational area. See also **stability operations**. (Derived from SSTR JOC) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-6)

**security forces.** Police and constabulary forces, as well as military and paramilitary forces, that protect societies from criminal, terrorist, and other threats to public order. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-6)

**special operations.** Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called **SO**. (JP 3-05) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, pp. B-6 to B-7)

**stability operations.** (1) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02) (2) Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions. (DODD 3000.05)

**strategic level of war.** (1) The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02) (2) The level of war at which a state or non-state actor, often as a member of an alliance or coalition, determines strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses its resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish strategic military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, P. B-7)

**task.** A discrete action performed by an individual or organization to accomplish a mission. Tasks specify what actions must be performed, not who will perform them, how they will be performed, or what means will be employed to perform them. (CJCSM 3500.04C) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-8)

**terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02) The

calculated use or threat of unlawful political violence against noncombatants, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies through fear. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-8)


**terrorist** — An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also **terrorism**. (JP 3-07.2) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 553)

**terrorist group** — Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also **terrorism**. (JP 3-07.2) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 553)

**unconventional warfare** — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called **UW**. (JP 3-05) (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008a, p. 574)


**ungoverned area**. An operational area in which no effective government exists to control the territory and population, or over which the state government is unable to extend control. (Proposed) (U.S. Special Operations Command & Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007, p. B-8)

## APPENDIX C: CENTER FOR GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY EFFECTS OVERVIEW (FROM GUTTIERI, 2008B)

The image shows a slide titled 'Program Objectives'. The slide features the NPS logo at the top left and the title 'Program Objectives' in a large, bold, white font. The main content is a bulleted list of program objectives, which includes:

- Technically competent force responsive to the current and future needs of the joint community
- Intellectual capital to address emerging challenges of security and stability in the context of globalization.
- Integrated educational programs for stability, security, and development.
- Partnered with military, academic and inter-agency organizations.
  - Military: USN, USMC, JFCOM, NDU and PKSOI
  - Interagency: USAID, S/CRS, USIP
  - Academic: NPS, Harvard, UCLA, and others
  - International: University of Geneva and National University of Singapore

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The slide is titled "Leader development for complex operations" and features a quote from Robert M. Gates about the need for unconventional thinkers in an unconventional era of warfare. The quote is attributed to him as the Secretary of Defense on April 21, 2008, at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. The slide also includes the NPS logo and the URL www.nps.edu.

**Leader development for complex operations**

**“An unconventional era of warfare requires unconventional thinkers. That is because this era’s range of security challenges, from global terrorism to ethnic conflicts, from rogue nations to rising powers, cannot be overcome by traditional military means alone. Conflict will... require the integration of all elements of national power.”**

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates  
Remarks at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base,  
Montgomery, Alabama April 21, 2008

www.nps.edu

- Society, Security and Globalization
- Focus on prevention and stability:
  - Provincial Reconstruction Teams
  - COCOM priorities (e.g., AFRICOM)
  - Early intervention supporting TSCP and S/CRS
- How to prepare people to work together in networked environments to build security?

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- US Navy Research faculty with national security expertise
- Premier DOD education capable of conducting classified and unclassified work
- Graduate education since 2001 – Stabilization and Reconstruction
  - Pre-deployment education – LDESP
  - Practitioner education – CSRS, DRMI
- Field exercises
- Operational reachback


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2001	MA Track in Stabilization and Reconstruction
2004	Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
2007	Curriculum Working Group on Cooperation in Globalization, Stability and Security US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute UCLA Harvard Humanitarian Initiative NDU
2008	Security and Development program development March – Certificate / DL development e.g. case studies June to August – Review and validation of certificate program July – UCLA in Geneva July 28 – August 1 Research program meeting August – Cultural education event in Monterey September – Complete resident, hybrid, and Distance Learning programs

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## Gap Analysis

- **Education and Training Gap**  
Non-aligned efforts,  
Pre-deployment Preparation
- **Discipline Interoperability Gap**  
Different organizational  
cultures, approaches
- **Institutional Gap**  
Processes to capture and  
analyze data/lessons learned
- **Operational Picture Gap**  
Lack of standardized,  
integrated information
- **Refuge to Development Gap**  
Need for agreed definition on what  
sustainable development entails



How to synchronize and align efforts?

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## Content Development Goals and Objectives

- GOAL: Accredited education system linking the USN, USMC, and USA civil affairs communities with the interagency.
- Tactical and operational practitioners in stability operations capable of conversing and operating seamlessly within the joint, civilian, and host nation environments
- Vetted and approved through the joint civil affairs community.
- Accessible through both resident and DL programs.
- Interlinked university partnerships with reciprocity nationwide
- Initial programs ready for execution and student enrollment beginning 1 Oct 08.

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


## Content Development

- FY08 funded program for 3 foundational graduate courses on security, development and global change: Global Challenges; Stability and Security; Analytics for Security and Development.
- Partnered with UCLA to prepare a global governance field study program in Geneva in July 2008.
- Developing a series of advanced cultural education workshops with the Defense Language Institute.

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## Content Development The Learning Continuum



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## Content Development DOD, Interagency, and Intl Focus Areas


State Capacity*	External Influences	Influence drivers**	Framing
Public Health	Environment	International	Culture
Economics	Climate	Organizations	Perception
Governance	Demographics	National agencies	
Infrastructure	Natural Resources	Non-governmental organizations	
Essential Services		Spoilers	
Agriculture			
Rule of Law			
Information Systems			

\*Any community needs to be viable; State capacity relies on the government stability to handle an outside crisis


\*\*-of conflict & actors (people who have ideas); - Positive / negative

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## Foundation Course Interconnectedness




## Content Development Stability, Security, and Development Masters



- Working with Army PKSOI to update and refine the Measuring Performance In Conflict Environments (MPICE)
- Host a biannual conference with Singapore regarding advanced maritime security (next meeting in July 2008 in DC)
- Strategic Collaboration Summary (28 Apr 08)
  - See attached handout

## Future Military Task Organization (Proposal) Stability Operations



## Development of West Coast Future Stab Ops Training Centers (Proposal) Stability Operations Training Center

- Area:
  - Central CA with geographic centers at Fort Hunter Liggett (FHL), Camp Parks, NPS Defense Language Institute, Marina, and Moffett
- Advantages
  - Training:
    - Army Opt Opt Training Center (AOTC)
    - Ability to train at FCBs, with indigenous populations, and to set up remote PRT like structures.
  - Demographics:
    - Urban to rural
    - Moving to High Tech
    - Multi-lingual (English, Spanish, Asian)
  - Terrain:
    - High desert, mountains / remote
    - All types of roads (primary, secondary, improved)
    - Temperate (limited hot/dry training)
  - Other:
    - Wealth of NGOs and academic facilities
    - Home to 2 of 6 USA CAPOC Cmds
- Disadvantages
  - Lack of official mobilization platform
  - Cost of living and services at FHL
  - Cost of movement and creation of administrative space at FHL.



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## Way Ahead

### June to September 2008

- Provide course feedback to assist NPS validate the course to meet National Maritime Security Strategy
- Develop final course documents for execution by US Army Reserve by 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter FY08 (*earliest date*).
- Coordinate JFCOM on proposal to create a Joint Interagency Stability Operations Center and Schoolhouse
- Draft proposal to create a career education program for DOS S/CRS linked to NSF Scholarship for Service

### 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter, FY09

- Assist NPS conduct a pilot test of the Stability, Security, and Development certificate program (Commander, US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Commander the US Army Reserve Command has agreed to fund, 30 Apr 08)

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POCs:



Dr Karen Guttieri  
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# Questions

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## APPENDIX D: CAQC COURSE SUMMARY (AS OF SEPTEMBER 2008)

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### Course Summary

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#### Academic Time:

<b>Module:</b> A / 001	32.6
<b>Title:</b> Civil Affairs Skills and Knowledge	
<b>Module:</b> B / 001	20.4
<b>Title:</b> Military Knowledge	
<b>Module:</b> C / 001	19.0
<b>Title:</b> Cultural Education	
<b>Module:</b> G / 001	27.0
<b>Title:</b> Adaptive Thinking and Leadership	
<b>Module:</b> H / 001	34.0
<b>Title:</b> Planning	
<b>Module:</b> I / 001	67.0
<b>Title:</b> Civil Affairs Operations	
<b>Module:</b> J / 001	18.0
<b>Title:</b> Program Management	
<b>Module:</b> K / 001	31.0
<b>Title:</b> Civil Affairs Core Tasks	
<b>Module:</b> M / 001	220.0
<b>Title:</b> Regional Research and Analysis	
<b>Module:</b> N / 001	85.1
<b>Title:</b> Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills	
<b>Module:</b> O / 001	42.9
<b>Title:</b> Mission Planning - CPX	
<b>Module:</b> P / 001	48.0
<b>Title:</b> Soldier's Urban Reaction Facility - STX	
<b>Module:</b> Q / 001	160.0
<b>Title:</b> Civil Affairs Operation - STX	
<b>Module:</b> R / 001	
<b>Title:</b> Non-Academic Administrative Times	

**Purpose:** This module is designed to train Soldiers on general Civil Affairs skills and knowledge.

**Remarks:** This module trains on general skills and knowledge, along with Civil Affairs Critical Individual Tasks: 331-38B-1003 - Identify the Steps of Civil Affairs Methodology; 331-38B-1004 - Define Civil Information Management; 331-38B-1010 - Define the Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Areas; 331-38B-1012 - Define Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; 331-38B-1013 - Define Populace and Resources Control; 331-38B-1018 - Define Support to Civil Administration; 331-38B-1020 - Describe the Organization and Function of a Civil-Military Operations Center; 331-38B-1032 - Define Transition Operations; 331-38B-1035 - Identify the Organization and Function of Civil Affairs; 331-38B-1036 - Identify the Functions and Responsibilities of the Civil-Military Operations Staff Section; 331-38B-1040 - Define Nation Assistance; 331-38B-2011 - Identify the Capabilities of Other Organizations in Support of Civil-Military Operations; and 331-38B-2012 - Conduct Liaison with Other Organization.

**Lesson Title:** The History of Civil-Military Operations and U.S. Army Civil Affairs

**Action Text:** Describe aspects of the history of Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA).

**Lesson Title:** U.S. Army Special Operations Structure and Missions

**Action Text:** Determine Special Operations Forces (SOF) Organization, Capabilities and Core Missions

**Lesson Title:** Civil-Military Operations

**Action Text:** Describe the Concepts and Principles of Civil Affairs' Support to Civil-Military Operations

**Lesson Title:** Civil-Military Operations Staff Structure and Function

**Action Text:** Describe the Functions and Responsibilities of the Civil-Military Operations Staff Section

**Lesson Title:** Civil Affairs Structure and Function

**Action Text:** Describe the Civil Affairs Structure and Function

**Lesson Title:** Civil Affairs Support to Full Spectrum Operations

**Action Text:** Identify the characteristics and components of Full Spectrum Operations

**Lesson Title:** Unconventional Warfare

**Action Text:** Identify aspects of unconventional warfare (UW)

**Lesson Title:** Foreign Internal Defense

**Action Text:** Identify aspects of Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

**Lesson Title:** Counter Insurgency

**Action Text:** Identify aspects of counter insurgency (COIN)

**Lesson Title:** Provincial Reconstruction Teams

**Action Text:** Describe the function and structure of provincial reconstruction teams.

**Lesson Title:** Intergovernmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Other Government Agencies

**Action Text:** Describe the Roles and Functions of Intergovernmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Other Government Agencies

**Lesson Title:** Overview Civil Affairs Methodology

**Action Text:** Describe Civil Affairs Methodology

**Lesson Title:** Civil Affairs Concepts and Principles

**Action Text:** Describe the Concepts and Principles of Civil Affairs

**Module:** B / 001

**Title:** Military Knowledge

**Purpose:** This module is designed to train Soldiers on general military skills and knowledge.

**Remarks:** This module trains Civil Affairs Critical Tasks: 331-305-0610 - Integrate With the Supported Staff; 331-38B-1037 - Identify Command Relations; 331-38B-1039 - Identify Army Staff Structure and Responsibilities; 331-38B-3023 - Identify Joint Force Staff Structure, Responsibilities, and Operations; 331-38B-1024 - Conduct Military Briefings; 331-38B-1029 - Process Classified Material; 331-305-0801 - Conduct a Media Interview; 331-38B-1022 - Prepare for a Media Interview; 331-38B-2009 - Implement the Use of Interpreters in Civil Affairs Operations; and 331-38B-1001 - Identify the Basic Steps Involved in the Problem Solving Process.

**Lesson Title:** Army Command and Staff Structure

**Action Text:** Describe the Army Command and Staff Structure

**Lesson Title:** Joint Command and Staff Structure

**Action Text:** Identify Joint Force Staff Structure, Responsibilities, and Operations

**Lesson Title:** Law of Armed Conflict

**Action Text:** Describe the rules of law to situations encountered in all levels of conflict

**Lesson Title:** Property Control

**Action Text:** Apply Property Control Measures Applicable to Occupying Force and to Forces Engaged in Combat Activities

**Lesson Title:** Military Briefings

**Action Text:** Present a Military Briefings

**Action Text:** Safeguard classified materials and documents

**Condition:** In a classroom environment, given instruction on classified material and a student study guide.

**Lesson Title:** Media

**Action Text:** Prepare for a Media Interview

**Lesson Title:** Interpreters

**Action Text:** Describe the Concepts for Using Interpreters

**Lesson Title:** Terrorism

**Action Text:** Describe the doctrine of terrorist organizations and tactics.

**Lesson Title:** Basic Problem Solving Process

**Action Text:** Identify the Basic Steps Involved in the Problem Solving Process

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## **APPENDIX E: JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN PLANNING WORKSHOP SYLLABUS (AS OF SEPTEMBER 2008)**

Course Code: SOED-JCMOCPW  
PDS Code: [None]

Duration: 5 Days  
Security Level: UNCLASS

Course Director  
Name: Mr. Terry Doan, Ops Dept Deputy  
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### **Course Description**

This course will educate students on how to apply joint civil-military operations (CMO) doctrine to successfully conduct operational-level CMO campaign planning to support a joint force commander's mission, emphasizing the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and incorporating the interaction between military staff members and representatives of other U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The Joint CMO Campaign Planning Workshop uses faculty speakers, guest experts, and an end-of-course exercise. Personnel will work in an academic environment analyzing the civil dimension, developing and coordinating staff estimates and courses of action, and presenting a Course of Action (COA) decision brief with recommended CA force structure; they will participate in an after-action review.

**Target Audience:** Civil affairs majors and lieutenant colonels; preference will be given to potential CMO planners in those positions most likely to deploy. Personnel with deployment experience and/or planning experience at JTF/corps/division level are also desired. Personnel outside the target audience will be accepted on a space-available basis.

### **Course Objectives**

1. ESW understand the complexities of the civil-military planning environment
2. ESW understand the fundamentals of joint doctrine, especially as it relates to CMO.
3. ESW understand the relationship of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) in CMO planning.
4. ESW apply JOPP procedures and the CMO perspective to a scenario driven planning exercise while functioning as CMO planners on a joint staff

### **Course Overview**

## **Lesson 1      Interagency Planning and Coordination**

Lesson focuses on introducing CMO planners to the interagency community and processes. Discussion includes the members of the community and their outlook on planning and coordination, an expanded definition of the instruments of national power, and the dynamics of interagency coordination and political-military planning.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the difficulties involved in planning and coordination within the interagency environment.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the members of the interagency community.

Explain the differences in problem-solving processes between various agencies .

Explain how national strategic guidance is implemented during planning.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss how better understanding the interagency process will enable civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of this process to the CMO planning environment.

Course Objective Link: 1-3

## **Lesson 2      Joint Civil Affairs Concepts and Planning**

Lesson focuses on civil affairs operations in the joint community. Discussion includes a recap of the six civil affairs mission areas, an explanation of key civil-military operations planning considerations, and a discussion of Joint CMO Task Force organization and functions.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the unique aspects of joint civil affairs operations.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Outline the range of military operations.

Distinguish between civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs (CA).

Identify civil-military missions in support of major regional conflicts and other combat operations.

Outline the types and nature of CMO.

Outline the concept of civil affairs employment.

Explain the general CMO planning considerations.

Explain the CMO planning considerations for Military Operations other Than War (MOOTW)

Explain the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF).

Explain the potential organization and responsibilities of a JCMOTF.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss the difference between civil-military operations and civil affairs.

Discuss civil-military operations planning considerations.

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a JCMOTF.

Course Objective Link: 1-2

### **Lesson 3 Analysis of the Civil Environment**

Lesson focuses on providing students with a rubric for analyzing the civil dimension of the operational environment. Discussion includes the six categories of the rubric and the relevance of civil reconnaissance and MOEs.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the process for analyzing the civil dimension and using that to support planning.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Using process for analyzing the civil dimension (as outlined in JP 3-57.1, Ch VII), summarize a CMO staff assessment (Estimate) examining the six interrelated factors: key civil geographic areas, infrastructure and buildings, institutional capabilities, influential organizations, key communications and populace, and events.

Explain how Civil Reconnaissance will support the planning process.

Explain the use of proper Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in supporting operational planning.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss how better analyzing the civil dimension will enable civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of this process to the CMO planning environment.

Course Objective Link: 1-2

### **Lesson 4 Joint Campaign Planning**

Lesson focuses on providing the students with a basic understanding of the fundamentals of campaign planning. Discussion includes the many sources of national guidance and theater strategy, the instruments of national power, and fundamentals of campaign design.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the fundamentals of joint planning, especially as they apply to campaign planning.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the two broad categories of joint military planning.

Distinguish between the five types of joint operation plans.

Distinguish between the seven types of joint operation orders.

Explain the critical planning factors to include center of gravity.

Describe the elements of operational design to include the concepts of decisive points, timing and tempo, culmination, and synergy.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss how better understanding the joint planning process will enable civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the application of CMO considerations to the joint planning process.

Course Objective Link: 1-3

### **Lesson 5 Legal and Fiscal Issues in CMO**

Lesson focuses on legal and fiscal issues which will impact on CMO planners. Discussion includes international law issues (responsibilities of an occupying force, combatant-non-combatant issues, host nation/coalition issues), domestic law issues (fiscal constraints, Rules of Engagement), and Human Rights issues.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the legal and fiscal issues confronting the CMO practitioner in the operational area.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the various sources of funding used to support CMO.

Identify the legal issues likely to face the CMO practitioner.

Explain the importance of keeping the Staff Judge Advocate informed on all legal and fiscal issues.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss the potential negative consequences of legal and fiscal missteps.

Help other students understand the importance of keeping the unit legal advisor involved.

Course Objective Link: 1-3

### **Lesson 6 JOPES**

Lessons focuses on the components of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Discussion includes national and strategic guidance, the military decision-making process, and the steps in and interrelationships between the deliberate planning and crisis action planning processes.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the basics of JOPES, the deliberate planning process, and the JTF Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Describe the Joint Planning and Execution Community.

Describe the Contingency Planning Process

Describe Crisis Action Planning.

Describe the Adaptive Planning Process

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss how understanding JOPES will enable civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of JOPES to the CMO planning environment.

Course Objective Link: 1-3

### **Lesson 7 JTF Operations and Concepts**

Lesson focuses on formation, structure, and organization of a joint task force (JTF). Discussion includes how joint forces are organized, what the command and control relationships are, how a JTF staff is organized, and who in a JTF is responsible for operational planning.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the fundamentals of joint operations and JTFs.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Define the levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical)

Explain the unified action scope at various levels of command (Fig II-2, JP 3-0)

Distinguish between the various command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and Support (to include categories of support)) (JP 3-0, (Ch III))

Describe the basic organization of forces (combatant commands, unified commands, specified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces (JTF), service components, and functional components (include JSOTF & JCMOTF)) (JP 3-57, Fig I-8)

Identify the basic organization of a joint operational area

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss the importance of understanding how the civil-military operations staff section is relevant to the organization and functions of a Joint Task Force.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the application of CMO considerations to the JTF operations.

Course Objective Link: 1-3

### **Lesson 8 Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) for CMO**

Lesson focuses on making students more familiar with the joint operation planning process. Discussion includes developing a CMO Staff Estimate and then developing, analyzing, comparing, and selecting CMO Courses of Action, and including other planning considerations.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the CMO planning factors and perspectives in JOPP.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Explain the seven steps of the JOPP  
Describe the Mission Analysis step  
Describe the COA Development step  
Describe the COA Analysis and Wargaming step  
Describe the COA Comparison step

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss how better understanding the joint operation planning process (JOPP) will enable civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of this process to the CMO planning environment.

Course Objective Link: 1-3

### **Lesson 9      Medical Issues in CMO**

### **Lesson 10    Practical Exercise: Analysis of Civil Dimension**

Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given scenario. Students will apply the analysis rubric taught in the course to a given fictional scenario.

#### **OBJECTIVES:**

ESW apply the process for analyzing the civil dimension to the emerging crisis

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Using process for analyzing the civil dimension (as outlined in JP 3-57.1, Ch VII), prepare a CMO staff assessment (Estimate) examining the six interrelated factors: key civil geographic areas, infrastructure and buildings, institutional capabilities, influential organizations, key communications and populace, and events.

Determine the appropriate Civil Center of Gravity, Named Civil Interests, Targeted Civil Interests, and Decisive Civil Engagement Points (FM 3-05.401)

Produce a briefing to their group leader on their analysis of the civil dimension

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the significant factors in the scenario relevant to CMO.

Share thoughts with others in the group on the analysis of the civil dimension.

Course Objective Link: 1-4

### **Lesson 11    Practical Exercise: Mission Analysis**

Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given scenario. Students will conduct mission analysis of a given fictional scenario and present a briefing.

## **OBJECTIVES:**

ESW apply the process for analyzing a mission after receipt of a warning order in a given scenario.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Distinguish key facts and assumptions that are relevant to CMO planning during mission analysis.

Determine, during mission analysis, relevant constraints and restraints (JP 3-57, Ch III) based upon provided commander JTF (CJTF) planning guidance, intent (end state) and overall mission parameters.

Explain whether or not this operation should have a predominantly CMO center of gravity (critical factor).

Analyze commander's mission and intent.

Identify tasks.

Conduct risk analysis.

Determine end state.

Develop mission statement.

Produce a briefing to their group leader on their analysis of the mission.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the significant factors in the scenario relevant to CMO.

Propose ideas for the recommended revised mission statement.

Assist in the development of the Mission Analysis briefing.

Course Objective Link: 1-4

## **Lesson 12      Practical Exercise: CMO COA Development and Analysis**

Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given scenario. Students will apply selected steps of the joint operation planning process to develop and select a CMO Course of Action.

## **OBJECTIVES:**

ESW apply the process for analyzing the civil dimension to the emerging crisis

ESW apply the CMO planning perspective, factors, and processes to the given scenario.

ESW apply the four phases of JTF operational planning process (mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, and COA comparison) to produce and deliver a decision briefing

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Explain whether or not this operation should have a predominantly CMO center of gravity (critical factor).

Infer, during course of action (COA) development, the relevant perspectives based on CMO planning considerations

Extend the key factors of operational art to the COA analysis process.

Produce a recommended COA, based upon COA comparison that includes operational concepts for campaign planning decisive points, phasing/sequencing, and relevant CMO lines of operation.

Produce a recommended CA force structure to support the recommended COA.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the significant factors in the scenario relevant to CMO.

Propose ideas for the recommended Course of Action (COA).

Proposed ideas for the recommended force structure.

Assist in the development of the COA briefing.

Course Objective Link: 1-4

### **Lesson 13 Practical Exercise: CMO COA Decision Brief**

Lesson focuses on student application of the course learning objectives to a given scenario. Students will brief their selected CMO COA to the Course Senior Mentor.

#### **OBJECTIVES:**

ESW apply the four phases of JOPP (mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, and COA comparison) to produce and deliver a decision briefing

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Produce a decision briefing with a recommended COA and force structure.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Assist in the delivery of the COA briefing.

Course Objective Link: 1-4

### **Lesson 14 Future Civil-Military Operations Issues (Lecture of Opportunity)**

Lesson focuses on the future of Civil Affairs and CMO. Discussion includes new capabilities, emerging doctrinal issues, and planned changes to CA force structure.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW know the future issues facing the civil affairs community and the emerging doctrine and trends.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the future issues facing the civil-affairs community to include emerging/undefined capabilities.

Outline emerging civil affairs doctrine, missions, and trends.

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Discuss how better understanding future issues will enable civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of future environment to the CMO planning environment.

Course Objective Link: 1-3

**Lesson 15 CA Information Management (Lecture of Opportunity)**

Lesson focuses on making students familiar with the latest techniques and procedures for information management in civil-military operations. Discussion includes an introduction to the DOS Humanitarian Information Unit, the technologies available and currently in use, and current Civil Affairs initiatives in information management.

**OBJECTIVE:** ESW understand the tools and processes available to support information management in support of CMO.

Cognitive Measurable Samples of Behavior:

Identify the tools and technologies available to support information management in CMO.

Explain why it is important to effectively manage information in CMO.

Give examples of how information management techniques are being used operationally in support of CMO

Affective Measurable Samples of Behavior:



Discuss how better understanding information management processes will enable civil-military staff personnel to more effectively support their commanders.

Ask insightful questions during the lesson on the applications of these processes to the CMO planning environment.

Course Objective Link: 1-2

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
## APPENDIX F: THE MYSTIC DIAMOND (FROM EDMONDS, 2007)



## Counterinsurgency Maxims to Follow

- Because you suffer from an information disadvantage, you must strengthen your influence with and control over the local populace.
- Gaining popular support is a zero-sum game. Your loss is the insurgent's gain, and vice versa.
- The overall strategy identifies the local populace as the center of gravity in the COIN fight and winning popular support as the key to your ability to remedy your information disadvantage and win the conflict.
- The indirect approach of working through the local populace and indigenous security forces to target the insurgents thus becomes the most direct path to victory

Population is the Center of Gravity (COG)



The Most Direct Path to Victory Requires an Indirect Approach

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